Victorian Age

by Chesterton · Cluster: Artist and Society · Truth · Regency Georgian England

Abstract

A book-length critical survey of Victorian literature, treating the Victorian Compromise, its great novelists and poets, and the breakup of that compromise; argues that a writer’s creed and moral attitude are inseparable from his art.

Testo / Text

Readability (prose)57.9 Flesch ease10.7 FK grade14 Fog13% complex22.3 words/sent

Connections

Characters: Thomas Gradgrind, Jane Eyre, Mr Rochester, Heathcliff, Samuel Pickwick, Seth Pecksniff, Little Nell, Daniel Quilp, David Copperfield, Betsey Trotwood, King Arthur, Major Pendennis, Lancelot, Silas Marner, Tess

Themes & Concepts: Artist and Society, Faith and Doubt, Order vs Chaos, Reform, Democracy, Class Conflict, Satire of Society, Critique of Progress, Economics, History Forms & Genres: Literary Criticism, Essay, Nonfiction Historical References: Regency Georgian England, Industrial Revolution, French Revolution, Reformation, Catholic Church, Puritanism, Romantic Movement (Sensibility), Christianity, Oxford Movement, Utilitarianism, Darwinism (Evolution)

Testo integrale / Full text

Project Gutenberg’s The Victorian Age in Literature, by G. K. Chesterton

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with

almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or

re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included

with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org

Title: The Victorian Age in Literature

Author: G. K. Chesterton

Release Date: June 20, 2006 [EBook #18639]

Language: English

Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1

*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE VICTORIAN AGE IN LITERATURE ***

Produced by Karina Aleksandrova, Juliet Sutherland and the

Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net

HOME UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE

No. 61

Editors:

THE RT. HON. H. A. L. FISHER, M.A., F.B.A.

PROF. GILBERT MURRAY, LITT.D., LL.D., F.B.A.

PROF. SIR J. ARTHUR THOMSON, M.A.

PROF. WILLIAM T. BREWSTER, M.A.

_A complete classified list of the volumes of The Home University

Library already published to be found at the back of this book._

THE VICTORIAN AGE

IN LITERATURE

BY

G. K. CHESTERTON

NEW YORK

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY

LONDON

THORNTON BUTTERWORTH LTD.

COPYRIGHT, 1913,

BY

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY

CONTENTS

CHAP. PAGE

  INTRODUCTION                                 7

I THE VICTORIAN COMPROMISE AND ITS ENEMIES    12

II THE GREAT VICTORIAN NOVELISTS 90

III THE GREAT VICTORIAN POETS 156

IV THE BREAK-UP OF THE COMPROMISE 204

  BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE                       253

  INDEX                                      255

The Editors wish to explain that this book is not put forward as an

authoritative history of Victorian literature. It is a free and personal

statement of views and impressions about the significance of Victorian

literature made by Mr. Chesterton at the Editors’ express invitation.

THE VICTORIAN AGE IN LITERATURE

INTRODUCTION

A section of a long and splendid literature can be most conveniently

treated in one of two ways. It can be divided as one cuts a currant cake

or a Gruyère cheese, taking the currants (or the holes) as they come. Or

it can be divided as one cuts wood—along the grain: if one thinks that

there is a grain. But the two are never the same: the names never come

in the same order in actual time as they come in any serious study of a

spirit or a tendency. The critic who wishes to move onward with the life

of an epoch, must be always running backwards and forwards among its

mere dates; just as a branch bends back and forth continually; yet the

grain in the branch runs true like an unbroken river.

Mere chronological order, indeed, is almost as arbitrary as alphabetical

order. To deal with Darwin, Dickens, Browning, in the sequence of the

birthday book would be to forge about as real a chain as the “Tacitus,

Tolstoy, Tupper” of a biographical dictionary. It might lend itself

more, perhaps, to accuracy: and it might satisfy that school of critics

who hold that every artist should be treated as a solitary craftsman,

indifferent to the commonwealth and unconcerned about moral things. To

write on that principle in the present case, however, would involve all

those delicate difficulties, known to politicians, which beset the

public defence of a doctrine which one heartily disbelieves. It is quite

needless here to go into the old “art for art’s sake”—business, or

explain at length why individual artists cannot be reviewed without

reference to their traditions and creeds. It is enough to say that with

other creeds they would have been, for literary purposes, other

individuals. Their views do not, of course, make the brains in their

heads any more than the ink in their pens. But it is equally evident

that mere brain-power, without attributes or aims, a wheel revolving in

the void, would be a subject about as entertaining as ink. The moment we

differentiate the minds, we must differentiate by doctrines and moral

sentiments. A mere sympathy for democratic merry-making and mourning

will not make a man a writer like Dickens. But without that sympathy

Dickens would not be a writer like Dickens; and probably not a writer at

all. A mere conviction that Catholic thought is the clearest as well as

the best disciplined, will not make a man a writer like Newman. But

without that conviction Newman would not be a writer like Newman; and

probably not a writer at all. It is useless for the æsthete (or any

other anarchist) to urge the isolated individuality of the artist, apart

from his attitude to his age. His attitude to his age is his

individuality: men are never individual when alone.

It only remains for me, therefore, to take the more delicate and

entangled task; and deal with the great Victorians, not only by dates

and names, but rather by schools and streams of thought. It is a task

for which I feel myself wholly incompetent; but as that applies to every

other literary enterprise I ever went in for, the sensation is not

wholly novel: indeed, it is rather reassuring than otherwise to realise

that I am now doing something that nobody could do properly. The chief

peril of the process, however, will be an inevitable tendency to make

the spiritual landscape too large for the figures. I must ask for

indulgence if such criticism traces too far back into politics or ethics

the roots of which great books were the blossoms; makes Utilitarianism

more important than Liberty or talks more of the Oxford Movement than

of The Christian Year. I can only answer in the very temper of the

age of which I write: for I also was born a Victorian; and sympathise

not a little with the serious Victorian spirit. I can only answer, I

shall not make religion more important than it was to Keble, or politics

more sacred than they were to Mill.

CHAPTER I

THE VICTORIAN COMPROMISE AND ITS ENEMIES

The previous literary life of this country had left vigorous many old

forces in the Victorian time, as in our time. Roman Britain and Mediæval

England are still not only alive but lively; for real development is not

leaving things behind, as on a road, but drawing life from them, as from

a root. Even when we improve we never progress. For progress, the

metaphor from the road, implies a man leaving his home behind him: but

improvement means a man exalting the towers or extending the gardens of

his home. The ancient English literature was like all the several

literatures of Christendom, alike in its likeness, alike in its very

unlikeness. Like all European cultures, it was European; like all

European cultures, it was something more than European. A most marked

and unmanageable national temperament is plain in Chaucer and the

ballads of Robin Hood; in spite of deep and sometimes disastrous changes

of national policy, that note is still unmistakable in Shakespeare, in

Johnson and his friends, in Cobbett, in Dickens. It is vain to dream of

defining such vivid things; a national soul is as indefinable as a

smell, and as unmistakable. I remember a friend who tried impatiently to

explain the word “mistletoe” to a German, and cried at last, despairing,

“Well, you know holly—mistletoe’s the opposite!” I do not commend this

logical method in the comparison of plants or nations. But if he had

said to the Teuton, “Well, you know Germany—England’s the

opposite”—the definition, though fallacious, would not have been wholly

false. England, like all Christian countries, absorbed valuable elements

from the forests and the rude romanticism of the North; but, like all

Christian countries, it drank its longest literary draughts from the

classic fountains of the ancients: nor was this (as is so often loosely

thought) a matter of the mere “Renaissance.” The English tongue and

talent of speech did not merely flower suddenly into the gargantuan

polysyllables of the great Elizabethans; it had always been full of the

popular Latin of the Middle Ages. But whatever balance of blood and

racial idiom one allows, it is really true that the only suggestion that

gets near the Englishman is to hint how far he is from the German. The

Germans, like the Welsh, can sing perfectly serious songs perfectly

seriously in chorus: can with clear eyes and clear voices join together

in words of innocent and beautiful personal passion, for a false maiden

or a dead child. The nearest one can get to defining the poetic temper

of Englishmen is to say that they couldn’t do this even for beer. They

can sing in chorus, and louder than other Christians: but they must have

in their songs something, I know not what, that is at once shamefaced

and rowdy. If the matter be emotional, it must somehow be also broad,

common and comic, as “Wapping Old Stairs” and “Sally in Our Alley.” If

it be patriotic, it must somehow be openly bombastic and, as it were,

indefensible, like “Rule Britannia” or like that superb song (I never

knew its name, if it has one) that records the number of leagues from

Ushant to the Scilly Isles. Also there is a tender love-lyric called “O

Tarry Trousers” which is even more English than the heart of _The

Midsummer Night’s Dream_. But our greatest bards and sages have often

shown a tendency to rant it and roar it like true British sailors; to

employ an extravagance that is half conscious and therefore half

humorous. Compare, for example, the rants of Shakespeare with the rants

of Victor Hugo. A piece of Hugo’s eloquence is either a serious triumph

or a serious collapse: one feels the poet is offended at a smile. But

Shakespeare seems rather proud of talking nonsense: I never can read

that rousing and mounting description of the storm, where it comes to—

"Who take the ruffian billows by the top,

Curling their monstrous heads, and _hanging_ them

With deafening clamour in the slippery clouds."

without seeing an immense balloon rising from the ground, with

Shakespeare grinning over the edge of the car, and saying, “You can’t

stop me: I am above reason now.” That is the nearest we can get to the

general national spirit, which we have now to follow through one brief

and curious but very national episode.

Three years before the young queen was crowned, William Cobbett was

buried at Farnham. It may seem strange to begin with this great

neglected name, rather than the old age of Wordsworth or the young death

of Shelley. But to any one who feels literature as human, the empty

chair of Cobbett is more solemn and significant than the throne. With

him died the sort of democracy that was a return to Nature, and which

only poets and mobs can understand. After him Radicalism is urban—and

Toryism suburban. Going through green Warwickshire, Cobbett might have

thought of the crops and Shelley of the clouds. But Shelley would have

called Birmingham what Cobbett called it—a hell-hole. Cobbett was one

with after Liberals in the ideal of Man under an equal law, a citizen of

no mean city. He differed from after Liberals in strongly affirming that

Liverpool and Leeds are mean cities.

It is no idle Hibernianism to say that towards the end of the eighteenth

century the most important event in English history happened in France.

It would seem still more perverse, yet it would be still more precise,

to say that the most important event in English history was the event

that never happened at all—the English Revolution on the lines of the

French Revolution. Its failure was not due to any lack of fervour or

even ferocity in those who would have brought it about: from the time

when the first shout went up for Wilkes to the time when the last

Luddite fires were quenched in a cold rain of rationalism, the spirit of

Cobbett, of rural republicanism, of English and patriotic democracy,

burned like a beacon. The revolution failed because it was foiled by

another revolution; an aristocratic revolution, a victory of the rich

over the poor. It was about this time that the common lands were finally

enclosed; that the more cruel game laws were first established; that

England became finally a land of landlords instead of common

land-owners. I will not call it a Tory reaction; for much of the worst

of it (especially of the land-grabbing) was done by Whigs; but we may

certainly call it Anti-Jacobin. Now this fact, though political, is not

only relevant but essential to everything that concerned literature. The

upshot was that though England was full of the revolutionary ideas,

nevertheless there was no revolution. And the effect of this in turn was

that from the middle of the eighteenth century to the middle of the

nineteenth the spirit of revolt in England took a wholly literary form.

In France it was what people did that was wild and elemental; in England

it was what people wrote. It is a quaint comment on the notion that the

English are practical and the French merely visionary, that we were

rebels in arts while they were rebels in arms.

It has been well and wittily said (as illustrating the mildness of

English and the violence of French developments) that the same Gospel of

Rousseau which in France produced the Terror, in England produced

Sandford and Merton. But people forget that in literature the English

were by no means restrained by Mr. Barlow; and that if we turn from

politics to art, we shall find the two parts peculiarly reversed. It

would be equally true to say that the same eighteenth-century

emancipation which in France produced the pictures of David, in England

produced the pictures of Blake. There never were, I think, men who gave

to the imagination so much of the sense of having broken out into the

very borderlands of being, as did the great English poets of the

romantic or revolutionary period; than Coleridge in the secret sunlight

of the Antarctic, where the waters were like witches’ oils; than Keats

looking out of those extreme mysterious casements upon that ultimate

sea. The heroes and criminals of the great French crisis would have been

quite as incapable of such imaginative independence as Keats and

Coleridge would have been incapable of winning the battle of Wattignies.

In Paris the tree of liberty was a garden tree, clipped very correctly;

and Robespierre used the razor more regularly than the guillotine.

Danton, who knew and admired English literature, would have cursed

freely over Kubla Khan; and if the Committee of Public Safety had not

already executed Shelley as an aristocrat, they would certainly have

locked him up for a madman. Even Hébert (the one really vile

Revolutionist), had he been reproached by English poets with worshipping

the Goddess of Reason, might legitimately have retorted that it was

rather the Goddess of Unreason that they set up to be worshipped.

Verbally considered, Carlyle’s French Revolution was more

revolutionary than the real French Revolution: and if Carrier, in an

exaggerative phrase, empurpled the Loire with carnage, Turner almost

literally set the Thames on fire.

This trend of the English Romantics to carry out the revolutionary idea

not savagely in works, but very wildly indeed in words, had several

results; the most important of which was this. It started English

literature after the Revolution with a sort of bent towards independence

and eccentricity, which in the brighter wits became individuality, and

in the duller ones, Individualism. English Romantics, English Liberals,

were not public men making a republic, but poets, each seeing a vision.

The lonelier version of liberty was a sort of aristocratic anarchism in

Byron and Shelley; but though in Victorian times it faded into much

milder prejudices and much more bourgeois crotchets, England retained

from that twist a certain odd separation and privacy. England became

much more of an island than she had ever been before. There fell from

her about this time, not only the understanding of France or Germany,

but to her own long and yet lingering disaster, the understanding of

Ireland. She had not joined in the attempt to create European democracy;

nor did she, save in the first glow of Waterloo, join in the

counter-attempt to destroy it. The life in her literature was still, to

a large extent, the romantic liberalism of Rousseau, the free and humane

truisms that had refreshed the other nations, the return to Nature and

to natural rights. But that which in Rousseau was a creed, became in

Hazlitt a taste and in Lamb little more than a whim. These latter and

their like form a group at the beginning of the nineteenth century of

those we may call the Eccentrics: they gather round Coleridge and his

decaying dreams or linger in the tracks of Keats and Shelley and Godwin;

Lamb with his bibliomania and creed of pure caprice, the most unique of

all geniuses; Leigh Hunt with his Bohemian impecuniosity; Landor with

his tempestuous temper, throwing plates on the floor; Hazlitt with his

bitterness and his low love affair; even that healthier and happier

Bohemian, Peacock. With these, in one sense at least, goes De Quincey.

He was, unlike most of these embers of the revolutionary age in letters,

a Tory; and was attached to the political army which is best represented

in letters by the virile laughter and leisure of Wilson’s _Noctes

Ambrosianæ_. But he had nothing in common with that environment. It

remained for some time as a Tory tradition, which balanced the cold and

brilliant aristocracy of the Whigs. It lived on the legend of Trafalgar;

the sense that insularity was independence; the sense that anomalies are

as jolly as family jokes; the general sense that old salts are the salt

of the earth. It still lives in some old songs about Nelson or Waterloo,

which are vastly more pompous and vastly more sincere than the cockney

cocksureness of later Jingo lyrics. But it is hard to connect De Quincey

with it; or, indeed, with anything else. De Quincey would certainly have

been a happier man, and almost certainly a better man, if he had got

drunk on toddy with Wilson, instead of getting calm and clear (as he

himself describes) on opium, and with no company but a book of German

metaphysics. But he would hardly have revealed those wonderful vistas

and perspectives of prose, which permit one to call him the first and

most powerful of the decadents: those sentences that lengthen out like

nightmare corridors, or rise higher and higher like impossible eastern

pagodas. He was a morbid fellow, and far less moral than Burns; for when

Burns confessed excess he did not defend it. But he has cast a gigantic

shadow on our literature, and was as certainly a genius as Poe. Also he

had humour, which Poe had not. And if any one still smarting from the

pinpricks of Wilde or Whistler, wants to convict them of plagiarism in

their “art for art” epigrams—he will find most of what they said said

better in Murder as One of the Fine Arts.

One great man remains of this elder group, who did their last work only

under Victoria; he knew most of the members of it, yet he did not belong

to it in any corporate sense. He was a poor man and an invalid, with

Scotch blood and a strong, though perhaps only inherited, quarrel with

the old Calvinism; by name Thomas Hood. Poverty and illness forced him

to the toils of an incessant jester; and the revolt against gloomy

religion made him turn his wit, whenever he could, in the direction of

a defence of happier and humaner views. In the long great roll that

includes Homer and Shakespeare, he was the last great man who really

employed the pun. His puns were not all good (nor were Shakespeare’s),

but the best of them were a strong and fresh form of art. The pun is

said to be a thing of two meanings; but with Hood there were three

meanings, for there was also the abstract truth that would have been

there with no pun at all. The pun of Hood is underrated, like the “wit”

of Voltaire, by those who forget that the words of Voltaire were not

pins, but swords. In Hood at his best the verbal neatness only gives to

the satire or the scorn a ring of finality such as is given by rhyme.

For rhyme does go with reason, since the aim of both is to bring things

to an end. The tragic necessity of puns tautened and hardened Hood’s

genius; so that there is always a sort of shadow of that sharpness

across all his serious poems, falling like the shadow of a sword.

“Sewing at once with a double thread a shroud as well as a shirt”—“We

thought her dying when she slept, and sleeping when she died”—“Oh God,

that bread should be so dear and flesh and blood so cheap”—none can

fail to note in these a certain fighting discipline of phrase, a

compactness and point which was well trained in lines like “A

cannon-ball took off his legs, so he laid down his arms.” In France he

would have been a great epigrammatist, like Hugo. In England he is a

punster.

There was nothing at least in this group I have loosely called the

Eccentrics that disturbs the general sense that all their generation was

part of the sunset of the great revolutionary poets. This fading glamour

affected England in a sentimental and, to some extent, a snobbish

direction; making men feel that great lords with long curls and whiskers

were naturally the wits that led the world. But it affected England also

negatively and by reaction; for it associated such men as Byron with

superiority, but not with success. The English middle classes were led

to distrust poetry almost as much as they admired it. They could not

believe that either vision at the one end or violence at the other could

ever be practical. They were deaf to that great warning of Hugo: “You

say the poet is in the clouds; but so is the thunderbolt.” Ideals

exhausted themselves in the void; Victorian England, very unwisely,

would have no more to do with idealists in politics. And this, chiefly,

because there had been about these great poets a young and splendid

sterility; since the pantheist Shelley was in fact washed under by the

wave of the world, or Byron sank in death as he drew the sword for

Hellas.

The chief turn of nineteenth-century England was taken about the time

when a footman at Holland House opened a door and announced “Mr.

Macaulay.” Macaulay’s literary popularity was representative and it was

deserved; but his presence among the great Whig families marks an

epoch. He was the son of one of the first “friends of the negro,” whose

honest industry and philanthropy were darkened by a religion of sombre

smugness, which almost makes one fancy they loved the negro for his

colour, and would have turned away from red or yellow men as needlessly

gaudy. But his wit and his politics (combined with that dropping of the

Puritan tenets but retention of the Puritan tone which marked his class

and generation), lifted him into a sphere which was utterly opposite to

that from which he came. This Whig world was exclusive; but it was not

narrow. It was very difficult for an outsider to get into it; but if he

did get into it he was in a much freer atmosphere than any other in

England. Of those aristocrats, the Old Guard of the eighteenth century,

many denied God, many defended Bonaparte, and nearly all sneered at the

Royal Family. Nor did wealth or birth make any barriers for those once

within this singular Whig world. The platform was high, but it was

level. Moreover the upstart nowadays pushes himself by wealth: but the

Whigs could choose their upstarts. In that world Macaulay found Rogers,

with his phosphorescent and corpse-like brilliancy; there he found

Sydney Smith, bursting with crackers of common sense, an admirable old

heathen; there he found Tom Moore, the romantic of the Regency, a

shortened shadow of Lord Byron. That he reached this platform and

remained on it is, I say, typical of a turning-point in the century. For

the fundamental fact of early Victorian history was this: the decision

of the middle classes to employ their new wealth in backing up a sort of

aristocratical compromise, and not (like the middle class in the French

Revolution) insisting on a clean sweep and a clear democratic programme.

It went along with the decision of the aristocracy to recruit itself

more freely from the middle class. It was then also that Victorian

“prudery” began: the great lords yielded on this as on Free Trade.

These two decisions have made the doubtful England of to-day; and

Macaulay is typical of them; he is the bourgeois in Belgravia. The

alliance is marked by his great speeches for Lord Grey’s Reform Bill: it

is marked even more significantly in his speech against the Chartists.

Cobbett was dead.

Macaulay makes the foundation of the Victorian age in all its very

English and unique elements: its praise of Puritan politics and

abandonment of Puritan theology; its belief in a cautious but perpetual

patching up of the Constitution; its admiration for industrial wealth.

But above all he typifies the two things that really make the Victorian

Age itself, the cheapness and narrowness of its conscious formulæ; the

richness and humanity of its unconscious tradition. There were two

Macaulays, a rational Macaulay who was generally wrong, and a romantic

Macaulay who was almost invariably right. All that was small in him

derives from the dull parliamentarism of men like Sir James Mackintosh;

but all that was great in him has much more kinship with the festive

antiquarianism of Sir Walter Scott.

As a philosopher he had only two thoughts; and neither of them is true.

The first was that politics, as an experimental science, must go on

improving, along with clocks, pistols or penknives, by the mere

accumulation of experiment and variety. He was, indeed, far too

strong-minded a man to accept the hazy modern notion that the soul in

its highest sense can change: he seems to have held that religion can

never get any better and that poetry rather tends to get worse. But he

did not see the flaw in his political theory; which is that unless the

soul improves with time there is no guarantee that the accumulations of

experience will be adequately used. Figures do not add themselves up;

birds do not label or stuff themselves; comets do not calculate their

own courses; these things are done by the soul of man. And if the soul

of man is subject to other laws, is liable to sin, to sleep, to

anarchism or to suicide, then all sciences including politics may fall

as sterile and lie as fallow as before man’s reason was made. Macaulay

seemed sometimes to talk as if clocks produced clocks, or guns had

families of little pistols, or a penknife littered like a pig. The other

view he held was the more or less utilitarian theory of toleration; that

we should get the best butcher whether he was a Baptist or a

Muggletonian, and the best soldier whether he was a Wesleyan or an

Irvingite. The compromise worked well enough in an England Protestant in

bulk; but Macaulay ought to have seen that it has its limitations. A

good butcher might be a Baptist; he is not very likely to be a Buddhist.

A good soldier might be a Wesleyan; he would hardly be a Quaker. For the

rest, Macaulay was concerned to interpret the seventeenth century in

terms of the triumph of the Whigs as champions of public rights; and he

upheld this one-sidedly but not malignantly in a style of rounded and

ringing sentences, which at its best is like steel and at its worst like

tin.

This was the small conscious Macaulay; the great unconscious Macaulay

was very different. His noble enduring quality in our literature is

this: that he truly had an abstract passion for history; a warm, poetic

and sincere enthusiasm for great things as such; an ardour and appetite

for great books, great battles, great cities, great men. He felt and

used names like trumpets. The reader’s greatest joy is in the writer’s

own joy, when he can let his last phrase fall like a hammer on some

resounding name like Hildebrand or Charlemagne, on the eagles of Rome or

the pillars of Hercules. As with Walter Scott, some of the best things

in his prose and poetry are the surnames that he did not make. And it is

remarkable to notice that this romance of history, so far from making

him more partial or untrustworthy, was the only thing that made him

moderately just. His reason was entirely one-sided and fanatical. It

was his imagination that was well-balanced and broad. He was

monotonously certain that only Whigs were right; but it was necessary

that Tories should at least be great, that his heroes might have foemen

worthy of their steel. If there was one thing in the world he hated it

was a High Church Royalist parson; yet when Jeremy Collier the Jacobite

priest raises a real banner, all Macaulay’s blood warms with the mere

prospect of a fight. “It is inspiriting to see how gallantly the

solitary outlaw advances to attack enemies formidable separately, and,

it might have been thought, irresistible when combined; distributes his

swashing blows right and left among Wycherley, Congreve and Vanbrugh,

treads the wretched D’Urfey down in the dirt beneath his feet; and

strikes with all his strength full at the towering crest of Dryden.”

That is exactly where Macaulay is great; because he is almost Homeric.

The whole triumph turns upon mere names; but men are commanded by

names. So his poem on the Armada is really a good geography book gone

mad; one sees the map of England come alive and march and mix under the

eye.

The chief tragedy in the trend of later literature may be expressed by

saying that the smaller Macaulay conquered the larger. Later men had

less and less of that hot love of history he had inherited from Scott.

They had more and more of that cold science of self-interests which he

had learnt from Bentham.

The name of this great man, though it belongs to a period before the

Victorian, is, like the name of Cobbett, very important to it. In

substance Macaulay accepted the conclusions of Bentham; though he

offered brilliant objections to all his arguments. In any case the soul

of Bentham (if he had one) went marching on, like John Brown; and in the

central Victorian movement it was certainly he who won. John Stuart Mill

was the final flower of that growth. He was himself fresh and delicate

and pure; but that is the business of a flower. Though he had to preach

a hard rationalism in religion, a hard competition in economics, a hard

egoism in ethics, his own soul had all that silvery sensitiveness that

can be seen in his fine portrait by Watts. He boasted none of that

brutal optimism with which his friends and followers of the Manchester

School expounded their cheery negations. There was about Mill even a

sort of embarrassment; he exhibited all the wheels of his iron universe

rather reluctantly, like a gentleman in trade showing ladies over his

factory. There shone in him a beautiful reverence for women, which is

all the more touching because, in his department, as it were, he could

only offer them so dry a gift as the Victorian Parliamentary Franchise.

Now in trying to describe how the Victorian writers stood to each other,

we must recur to the very real difficulty noted at the beginning: the

difficulty of keeping the moral order parallel with the chronological

order. For the mind moves by instincts, associations, premonitions and

not by fixed dates or completed processes. Action and reaction will

occur simultaneously: or the cause actually be found after the effect.

Errors will be resisted before they have been properly promulgated:

notions will be first defined long after they are dead. It is no good

getting the almanac to look up moonshine; and most literature in this

sense is moonshine. Thus Wordsworth shrank back into Toryism, as it

were, from a Shelleyan extreme of pantheism as yet disembodied. Thus

Newman took down the iron sword of dogma to parry a blow not yet

delivered, that was coming from the club of Darwin. For this reason no

one can understand tradition, or even history, who has not some

tenderness for anachronism.

Now for the great part of the Victorian era the utilitarian tradition

which reached its highest in Mill held the centre of the field; it was

the philosophy in office, so to speak. It sustained its march of

codification and inquiry until it had made possible the great victories

of Darwin and Huxley and Wallace. If we take Macaulay at the beginning

of the epoch and Huxley at the end of it, we shall find that they had

much in common. They were both square-jawed, simple men, greedy of

controversy but scornful of sophistry, dead to mysticism but very much

alive to morality; and they were both very much more under the influence

of their own admirable rhetoric than they knew. Huxley, especially, was

much more a literary than a scientific man. It is amusing to note that

when Huxley was charged with being rhetorical, he expressed his horror

of “plastering the fair face of truth with that pestilent cosmetic,

rhetoric,” which is itself about as well-plastered a piece of rhetoric

as Ruskin himself could have managed. The difference that the period had

developed can best be seen if we consider this: that while neither was

of a spiritual sort, Macaulay took it for granted that common sense

required some kind of theology, while Huxley took it for granted that

common sense meant having none. Macaulay, it is said, never talked about

his religion: but Huxley was always talking about the religion he hadn’t

got.

But though this simple Victorian rationalism held the centre, and in a

certain sense was the Victorian era, it was assailed on many sides,

and had been assailed even before the beginning of that era. The rest of

the intellectual history of the time is a series of reactions against

it, which come wave after wave. They have succeeded in shaking it, but

not in dislodging it from the modern mind. The first of these was the

Oxford Movement; a bow that broke when it had let loose the flashing

arrow that was Newman. The second reaction was one man; without teachers

or pupils—Dickens. The third reaction was a group that tried to create

a sort of new romantic Protestantism, to pit against both Reason and

Rome—Carlyle, Ruskin, Kingsley, Maurice—perhaps Tennyson. Browning

also was at once romantic and Puritan; but he belonged to no group, and

worked against materialism in a manner entirely his own. Though as a boy

he bought eagerly Shelley’s revolutionary poems, he did not think of

becoming a revolutionary poet. He concentrated on the special souls of

men; seeking God in a series of private interviews. Hence Browning,

great as he is, is rather one of the Victorian novelists than wholly of

the Victorian poets. From Ruskin, again, descend those who may be called

the Pre-Raphaelites of prose and poetry.

It is really with this rationalism triumphant, and with the romance of

these various attacks on it, that the study of Victorian literature

begins and proceeds. Bentham was already the prophet of a powerful sect;

Macaulay was already the historian of an historic party, before the true

Victorian epoch began. The middle classes were emerging in a state of

damaged Puritanism. The upper classes were utterly pagan. Their clear

and courageous testimony remains in those immortal words of Lord

Melbourne, who had led the young queen to the throne and long stood

there as her protector. “No one has more respect for the Christian

religion than I have; but really, when it comes to intruding it into

private life----” What was pure paganism in the politics of Melbourne

became a sort of mystical cynicism in the politics of Disraeli; and is

well mirrored in his novels—for he was a man who felt at home in

mirrors. With every allowance for aliens and eccentrics and all the

accidents that must always eat the edges of any systematic

circumference, it may still be said that the Utilitarians held the fort.

Of the Oxford Movement what remains most strongly in the Victorian Epoch

centres round the challenge of Newman, its one great literary man. But

the movement as a whole had been of great significance in the very

genesis and make up of the society: yet that significance is not quite

easy immediately to define. It was certainly not æsthetic ritualism;

scarcely one of the Oxford High Churchmen was what we should call a

Ritualist. It was certainly not a conscious reaching out towards Rome:

except on a Roman Catholic theory which might explain all our unrests by

that dim desire. It knew little of Europe, it knew nothing of Ireland,

to which any merely Roman Catholic revulsion would obviously have

turned. In the first instance, I think, the more it is studied, the more

it would appear that it was a movement of mere religion as such. It was

not so much a taste for Catholic dogma, but simply a hunger for dogma.

For dogma means the serious satisfaction of the mind. Dogma does not

mean the absence of thought, but the end of thought. It was a revolt

against the Victorian spirit in one particular aspect of it; which may

roughly be called (in a cosy and domestic Victorian metaphor) having

your cake and eating it too. It saw that the solid and serious

Victorians were fundamentally frivolous—because they were

fundamentally inconsistent.

A man making the confession of any creed worth ten minutes’ intelligent

talk, is always a man who gains something and gives up something. So

long as he does both he can create: for he is making an outline and a

shape. Mahomet created, when he forbade wine but allowed five wives: he

created a very big thing, which we have still to deal with. The first

French Republic created, when it affirmed property and abolished

peerages; France still stands like a square, four-sided building which

Europe has besieged in vain. The men of the Oxford Movement would have

been horrified at being compared either with Moslems or Jacobins. But

their sub-conscious thirst was for something that Moslems and Jacobins

had and ordinary Anglicans had not: the exalted excitement of

consistency. If you were a Moslem you were not a Bacchanal. If you were

a Republican you were not a peer. And so the Oxford men, even in their

first and dimmest stages, felt that if you were a Churchman you were not

a Dissenter. The Oxford Movement was, out of the very roots of its

being, a rational movement; almost a rationalist movement. In that it

differed sharply from the other reactions that shook the Utilitarian

compromise; the blinding mysticism of Carlyle, the mere manly

emotionalism of Dickens. It was an appeal to reason: reason said that if

a Christian had a feast day he must have a fast day too. Otherwise, all

days ought to be alike; and this was that very Utilitarianism against

which their Oxford Movement was the first and most rational assault.

This idea, even by reason of its reason, narrowed into a sort of sharp

spear, of which the spear blade was Newman. It did forget many of the

other forces that were fighting on its side. But the movement could

boast, first and last, many men who had this eager dogmatic quality:

Keble, who spoilt a poem in order to recognise a doctrine; Faber, who

told the rich, almost with taunts, that God sent the poor as eagles to

strip them; Froude, who with Newman announced his return in the arrogant

motto of Achilles. But the greater part of all this happened before what

is properly our period; and in that period Newman, and perhaps Newman

alone, is the expression and summary of the whole school. It was

certainly in the Victorian Age, and after his passage to Rome, that

Newman claimed his complete right to be in any book on modern English

literature. This is no place for estimating his theology: but one point

about it does clearly emerge. Whatever else is right, the theory that

Newman went over to Rome to find peace and an end of argument, is quite

unquestionably wrong. He had far more quarrels after he had gone over to

Rome. But, though he had far more quarrels, he had far fewer

compromises: and he was of that temper which is tortured more by

compromise than by quarrel. He was a man at once of abnormal energy and

abnormal sensibility: nobody without that combination could have written

the Apologia. If he sometimes seemed to skin his enemies alive, it was

because he himself lacked a skin. In this sense his Apologia is a

triumph far beyond the ephemeral charge on which it was founded; in this

sense he does indeed (to use his own expression) vanquish not his

accuser but his judges. Many men would shrink from recording all their

cold fits and hesitations and prolonged inconsistencies: I am sure it

was the breath of life to Newman to confess them, now that he had done

with them for ever. His _Lectures on the Present Position of English

Catholics_, practically preached against a raging mob, rise not only

higher but happier, as his instant unpopularity increases. There is

something grander than humour, there is fun, in the very first lecture

about the British Constitution as explained to a meeting of Russians.

But always his triumphs are the triumphs of a highly sensitive man: a

man must feel insults before he can so insultingly and splendidly

avenge them. He is a naked man, who carries a naked sword. The quality

of his literary style is so successful that it succeeds in escaping

definition. The quality of his logic is that of a long but passionate

patience, which waits until he has fixed all corners of an iron trap.

But the quality of his moral comment on the age remains what I have

said: a protest of the rationality of religion as against the increasing

irrationality of mere Victorian comfort and compromise. So far as the

present purpose is concerned, his protest died with him: he left few

imitators and (it may easily be conceived) no successful imitators. The

suggestion of him lingers on in the exquisite Elizabethan perversity of

Coventry Patmore; and has later flamed out from the shy volcano of

Francis Thompson. Otherwise (as we shall see in the parallel case of

Ruskin’s Socialism) he has no followers in his own age: but very many in

ours.

The next group of reactionaries or romantics or whatever we elect to

call them, gathers roughly around one great name. Scotland, from which

had come so many of those harsh economists who made the first Radical

philosophies of the Victorian Age, was destined also to fling forth (I

had almost said to spit forth) their fiercest and most extraordinary

enemy. The two primary things in Thomas Carlyle were his early Scotch

education and his later German culture. The first was in almost all

respects his strength; the latter in some respects his weakness. As an

ordinary lowland peasant, he inherited the really valuable historic

property of the Scots, their independence, their fighting spirit, and

their instinctive philosophic consideration of men merely as men. But he

was not an ordinary peasant. If he had laboured obscurely in his village

till death, he would have been yet locally a marked man; a man with a

wild eye, a man with an air of silent anger; perhaps a man at whom

stones were sometimes thrown. A strain of disease and suffering ran

athwart both his body and his soul. In spite of his praise of silence,

it was only through his gift of utterance that he escaped madness. But

while his fellow-peasants would have seen this in him and perhaps mocked

it, they would also have seen something which they always expect in such

men, and they would have got it: vision, a power in the mind akin to

second sight. Like many ungainly or otherwise unattractive Scotchmen, he

was a seer. By which I do not mean to refer so much to his

transcendental rhapsodies about the World-soul or the Nature-garment or

the Mysteries and Eternities generally, these seem to me to belong more

to his German side and to be less sincere and vital. I mean a real power

of seeing things suddenly, not apparently reached by any process; a

grand power of guessing. He saw the crowd of the new States General,

Danton with his “rude flattened face,” Robespierre peering mistily

through his spectacles. He saw the English charge at Dunbar. He

guessed that Mirabeau, however dissipated and diseased, had something

sturdy inside him. He guessed that Lafayette, however brave and

victorious, had nothing inside him. He supported the lawlessness of

Cromwell, because across two centuries he almost physically felt the

feebleness and hopelessness of the moderate Parliamentarians. He said a

word of sympathy for the universally vituperated Jacobins of the

Mountain, because through thick veils of national prejudice and

misrepresentation, he felt the impossibility of the Gironde. He was

wrong in denying to Scott the power of being inside his characters: but

he really had a good deal of that power himself. It was one of his

innumerable and rather provincial crotchets to encourage prose as

against poetry. But, as a matter of fact, he himself was much greater

considered as a kind of poet than considered as anything else; and the

central idea of poetry is the idea of guessing right, like a child.

He first emerged, as it were, as a student and disciple of Goethe. The

connection was not wholly fortunate. With much of what Goethe really

stood for he was not really in sympathy; but in his own obstinate way,

he tried to knock his idol into shape instead of choosing another. He

pushed further and further the extravagances of a vivid but very

unbalanced and barbaric style, in the praise of a poet who really

represented the calmest classicism and the attempt to restore a Hellenic

equilibrium in the mind. It is like watching a shaggy Scandinavian

decorating a Greek statue washed up by chance on his shores. And while

the strength of Goethe was a strength of completion and serenity, which

Carlyle not only never found but never even sought, the weaknesses of

Goethe were of a sort that did not draw the best out of Carlyle. The one

civilised element that the German classicists forgot to put into their

beautiful balance was a sense of humour. And great poet as Goethe was,

there is to the last something faintly fatuous about his half

sceptical, half sentimental self-importance; a Lord Chamberlain of

teacup politics; an earnest and elderly flirt; a German of the Germans.

Now Carlyle had humour; he had it in his very style, but it never got

into his philosophy. His philosophy largely remained a heavy Teutonic

idealism, absurdly unaware of the complexity of things; as when he

perpetually repeated (as with a kind of flat-footed stamping) that

people ought to tell the truth; apparently supposing, to quote

Stevenson’s phrase, that telling the truth is as easy as blind hookey.

Yet, though his general honesty is unquestionable, he was by no means

one of those who will give up a fancy under the shock of a fact. If by

sheer genius he frequently guessed right, he was not the kind of man to

admit easily that he had guessed wrong. His version of Cromwell’s filthy

cruelties in Ireland, or his impatient slurring over of the most

sinister riddle in the morality of Frederick the Great—these passages

are, one must frankly say, disingenuous. But it is, so to speak, a

generous disingenuousness; the heat and momentum of sincere admirations,

not the shuffling fear and flattery of the constitutional or patriotic

historian. It bears most resemblance to the incurable prejudices of a

woman.

For the rest there hovered behind all this transcendental haze a certain

presence of old northern paganism; he really had some sympathy with the

vast vague gods of that moody but not unmanly Nature-worship which seems

to have filled the darkness of the North before the coming of the Roman

Eagle or the Christian Cross. This he combined, allowing for certain

sceptical omissions, with the grisly Old Testament God he had heard

about in the black Sabbaths of his childhood; and so promulgated

(against both Rationalists and Catholics) a sort of heathen Puritanism:

Protestantism purged of its evidences of Christianity.

His great and real work was the attack on Utilitarianism: which did real

good, though there was much that was muddled and dangerous in the

historical philosophy which he preached as an alternative. It is his

real glory that he was the first to see clearly and say plainly the

great truth of our time; that the wealth of the state is not the

prosperity of the people. Macaulay and the Mills and all the regular run

of the Early Victorians, took it for granted that if Manchester was

getting richer, we had got hold of the key to comfort and progress.

Carlyle pointed out (with stronger sagacity and humour than he showed on

any other question) that it was just as true to say that Manchester was

getting poorer as that it was getting richer: or, in other words, that

Manchester was not getting richer at all, but only some of the less

pleasing people in Manchester. In this matter he is to be noted in

connection with national developments much later; for he thus became the

first prophet of the Socialists. Sartor Resartus is an admirable

fantasia; The French Revolution is, with all its faults, a really

fine piece of history; the lectures on Heroes contain some masterly

sketches of personalities. But I think it is in Past and Present, and

the essay on Chartism, that Carlyle achieves the work he was chosen by

gods and men to achieve; which possibly might not have been achieved by

a happier or more healthy-minded man. He never rose to more deadly irony

than in such macabre descriptions as that of the poor woman proving

her sisterhood with the rich by giving them all typhoid fever; or that

perfect piece of badinage about “Overproduction of Shirts”; in which

he imagines the aristocrats claiming to be quite clear of this offence.

“Will you bandy accusations, will you accuse us of overproduction? We

take the Heavens and the Earth to witness that we have produced nothing

at all… He that accuses us of producing, let him show himself. Let

him say what and when.” And he never wrote so sternly and justly as when

he compared the “divine sorrow” of Dante with the “undivine sorrow” of

Utilitarianism, which had already come down to talking about the

breeding of the poor and to hinting at infanticide. This is a

representative quarrel; for if the Utilitarian spirit reached its

highest point in Mill, it certainly reached its lowest point in Malthus.

One last element in the influence of Carlyle ought to be mentioned;

because it very strongly dominated his disciples—especially Kingsley,

and to some extent Tennyson and Ruskin. Because he frowned at the

cockney cheerfulness of the cheaper economists, they and others

represented him as a pessimist, and reduced all his azure infinities to

a fit of the blues. But Carlyle’s philosophy, more carefully considered,

will be found to be dangerously optimist rather than pessimist. As a

thinker Carlyle is not sad, but recklessly and rather unscrupulously

satisfied. For he seems to have held the theory that good could not be

definitely defeated in this world; and that everything in the long run

finds its right level. It began with what we may call the “Bible of

History” idea: that all affairs and politics were a clouded but unbroken

revelation of the divine. Thus any enormous and unaltered human

settlement—as the Norman Conquest or the secession of America—we must

suppose to be the will of God. It lent itself to picturesque treatment;

and Carlyle and the Carlyleans were above all things picturesque. It

gave them at first a rhetorical advantage over the Catholic and other

older schools. They could boast that their Creator was still creating;

that he was in Man and Nature, and was not hedged round in a Paradise or

imprisoned in a pyx. They could say their God had not grown too old for

war: that He was present at Gettysburg and Gravelotte as much as at

Gibeon and Gilboa. I do not mean that they literally said these

particular things: they are what I should have said had I been bribed to

defend their position. But they said things to the same effect: that

what manages finally to happen, happens for a higher purpose. Carlyle

said the French Revolution was a thing settled in the eternal councils

to be; and therefore (and not because it was right) attacking it was

“fighting against God.” And Kingsley even carried the principle so far

as to tell a lady she should remain in the Church of England mainly

because God had put her there. But in spite of its superficial

spirituality and encouragement, it is not hard to see how such a

doctrine could be abused. It practically comes to saying that God is on

the side of the big battalions—or at least, of the victorious ones.

Thus a creed which set out to create conquerors would only corrupt

soldiers; corrupt them with a craven and unsoldierly worship of success:

and that which began as the philosophy of courage ends as the philosophy

of cowardice. If, indeed, Carlyle were right in saying that right is

only “rightly articulated” might, men would never articulate or move in

any way. For no act can have might before it is done: if there is no

right, it cannot rationally be done at all. This element, like the

Anti-Utilitarian element, is to be kept in mind in connection with after

developments: for in this Carlyle is the first cry of Imperialism, as

(in the other case) of Socialism: and the two babes unborn who stir at

the trumpet are Mr. Bernard Shaw and Mr. Rudyard Kipling. Kipling also

carries on from Carlyle the concentration on the purely Hebraic parts of

the Bible. The fallacy of this whole philosophy is that if God is indeed

present at a modern battle, He may be present not as on Gilboa but

Golgotha.

Carlyle’s direct historical worship of strength and the rest of it was

fortunately not very fruitful; and perhaps lingered only in Froude the

historian. Even he is more an interruption than a continuity. Froude

develops rather the harsher and more impatient moral counsels of his

master than like Ruskin the more romantic and sympathetic. He carries on

the tradition of Hero Worship: but carries far beyond Carlyle the

practice of worshipping people who cannot rationally be called heroes.

In this matter that eccentric eye of the seer certainly helped Carlyle:

in Cromwell and Frederick the Great there was at least something

self-begotten, original or mystical; if they were not heroes they were

at least demigods or perhaps demons. But Froude set himself to the

praise of the Tudors, a much lower class of people; ill-conditioned

prosperous people who merely waxed fat and kicked. Such strength as

Henry VIII had was the strength of a badly trained horse that bolts, not

of any clear or courageous rider who controls him. There is a sort of

strong man mentioned in Scripture who, because he masters himself, is

more than he that takes a city. There is another kind of strong man

(known to the medical profession) who cannot master himself; and whom it

may take half a city to take alive. But for all that he is a low

lunatic, and not a hero; and of that sort were too many of the heroes

whom Froude attempted to praise. A kind of instinct kept Carlyle from

over-praising Henry VIII; or that highly cultivated and complicated

liar, Queen Elizabeth. Here, the only importance of this is that one of

Carlyle’s followers carried further that “strength” which was the real

weakness of Carlyle. I have heard that Froude’s life of Carlyle was

unsympathetic; but if it was so it was a sort of parricide. For the

rest, like Macaulay, he was a picturesque and partisan historian: but,

like Macaulay (and unlike the craven scientific historians of to-day) he

was not ashamed of being partisan or of being picturesque. Such studies

as he wrote on the Elizabethan seamen and adventurers, represent very

triumphantly the sort of romance of England that all this school was

attempting to establish; and link him up with Kingsley and the rest.

Ruskin may be very roughly regarded as the young lieutenant of Carlyle

in his war on Utilitarian Radicalism: but as an individual he presents

many and curious divergences. In the matter of style, he enriched

English without disordering it. And in the matter of religion (which

was the key of this age as of every other) he did not, like Carlyle, set

up the romance of the great Puritans as a rival to the romance of the

Catholic Church. Rather he set up and worshipped all the arts and

trophies of the Catholic Church as a rival to the Church itself. None

need dispute that he held a perfectly tenable position if he chose to

associate early Florentine art with a Christianity still comparatively

pure, and such sensualities as the Renaissance bred with the corruption

of a Papacy. But this does not alter, as a merely artistic fact, the

strange air of ill-ease and irritation with which Ruskin seems to tear

down the gargoyles of Amiens or the marbles of Venice, as things of

which Europe is not worthy; and take them away with him to a really

careful museum, situated dangerously near Clapham. Many of the great men

of that generation, indeed, had a sort of divided mind; an ethical

headache which was literally a “splitting headache”; for there was a

schism in the sympathies. When these men looked at some historic

object, like the Catholic Church or the French Revolution, they did not

know whether they loved or hated it most. Carlyle’s two eyes were out of

focus, as one may say, when he looked at democracy: he had one eye on

Valmy and the other on Sedan. In the same way, Ruskin had a strong right

hand that wrote of the great mediæval minsters in tall harmonies and

traceries as splendid as their own; and also, so to speak, a weak and

feverish left hand that was always fidgeting and trying to take the pen

away—and write an evangelical tract about the immorality of foreigners.

Many of their contemporaries were the same. The sea of Tennyson’s mind

was troubled under its serene surface. The incessant excitement of

Kingsley, though romantic and attractive in many ways, was a great deal

more like Nervous Christianity than Muscular Christianity. It would be

quite unfair to say of Ruskin that there was any major inconsistency

between his mediæval tastes and his very unmediæval temper: and minor

inconsistencies do not matter in anybody. But it is not quite unfair to

say of him that he seemed to want all parts of the Cathedral except the

altar.

As an artist in prose he is one of the most miraculous products of the

extremely poetical genius of England. The length of a Ruskin sentence is

like that length in the long arrow that was boasted of by the drawers of

the long bow. He draws, not a cloth-yard shaft but a long lance to his

ear: he shoots a spear. But the whole goes light as a bird and straight

as a bullet. There is no Victorian writer before him to whom he even

suggests a comparison, technically considered, except perhaps De

Quincey; who also employed the long rich rolling sentence that, like a

rocket, bursts into stars at the end. But De Quincey’s sentences, as I

have said, have always a dreamy and insecure sense about them, like the

turret on toppling turret of some mad sultan’s pagoda. Ruskin’s sentence

branches into brackets and relative clauses as a straight strong tree

branches into boughs and bifurcations, rather shaking off its burden

than merely adding to it. It is interesting to remember that Ruskin

wrote some of the best of these sentences in the attempt to show that he

did understand the growth of trees, and that nobody else did—except

Turner, of course. It is also (to those acquainted with his perverse and

wild rhetorical prejudices) even more amusing to remember that if a

Ruskin sentence (occupying one or two pages of small print) does not

remind us of the growth of a tree, the only other thing it does remind

of is the triumphant passage of a railway train.

Ruskin left behind him in his turn two quite separate streams of

inspiration. The first and more practical was concerned, like Carlyle’s

Chartism, with a challenge to the social conclusions of the orthodox

economists. He was not so great a man as Carlyle, but he was a much more

clear-headed man; and the point and stab of his challenge still really

stands and sticks, like a dagger in a dead man. He answered the theory

that we must always get the cheapest labour we can, by pointing out that

we never do get the cheapest labour we can, in any matter about which we

really care twopence. We do not get the cheapest doctor. We either get a

doctor who charges nothing or a doctor who charges a recognised and

respectable fee. We do not trust the cheapest bishop. We do not allow

admirals to compete. We do not tell generals to undercut each other on

the eve of a war. We either employ none of them or we employ all of them

at an official rate of pay. All this was set out in the strongest and

least sentimental of his books, Unto this Last; but many suggestions

of it are scattered through Sesame and Lilies, _The Political Economy

of Art_, and even Modern Painters. On this side of his soul Ruskin

became the second founder of Socialism. The argument was not by any

means a complete or unconquerable weapon, but I think it knocked out

what little remained of the brains of the early Victorian rationalists.

It is entirely nonsensical to speak of Ruskin as a lounging æsthete, who

strolled into economics, and talked sentimentalism. In plain fact,

Ruskin was seldom so sensible and logical (right or wrong) as when he

was talking about economics. He constantly talked the most glorious

nonsense about landscape and natural history, which it was his business

to understand. Within his own limits, he talked the most cold common

sense about political economy, which was no business of his at all.

On the other side of his literary soul, his mere unwrapping of the

wealth and wonder of European art, he set going another influence,

earlier and vaguer than his influence on Socialism. He represented what

was at first the Pre-Raphaelite School in painting, but afterwards a

much larger and looser Pre-Raphaelite School in poetry and prose. The

word “looser” will not be found unfair if we remember how Swinburne and

all the wildest friends of the Rossettis carried this movement forward.

They used the mediæval imagery to blaspheme the mediæval religion.

Ruskin’s dark and doubtful decision to accept Catholic art but not

Catholic ethics had borne rapid or even flagrant fruit by the time that

Swinburne, writing about a harlot, composed a learned and sympathetic

and indecent parody on the Litany of the Blessed Virgin.

With the poets I deal in another part of this book; but the influence of

Ruskin’s great prose touching art criticism can best be expressed in the

name of the next great prose writer on such subjects. That name is

Walter Pater: and the name is the full measure of the extent to which

Ruskin’s vague but vast influence had escaped from his hands. Pater

eventually joined the Church of Rome (which would not have pleased

Ruskin at all), but it is surely fair to say of the mass of his work

that its moral tone is neither Puritan nor Catholic, but strictly and

splendidly Pagan. In Pater we have Ruskin without the prejudices, that

is, without the funny parts. I may be wrong, but I cannot recall at this

moment a single passage in which Pater’s style takes a holiday or in

which his wisdom plays the fool. Newman and Ruskin were as careful and

graceful stylists as he. Newman and Ruskin were as serious, elaborate,

and even academic thinkers as he. But Ruskin let himself go about

railways. Newman let himself go about Kingsley. Pater cannot let himself

go for the excellent reason that he wants to stay: to stay at the point

where all the keenest emotions meet, as he explains in the splendid

peroration of The Renaissance. The only objection to being where all

the keenest emotions meet is that you feel none of them.

In this sense Pater may well stand for a substantial summary of the

æsthetes, apart from the purely poetical merits of men like Rossetti and

Swinburne. Like Swinburne and others he first attempted to use mediæval

tradition without trusting it. These people wanted to see Paganism

through Christianity: because it involved the incidental amusement of

seeing through Christianity itself. They not only tried to be in all

ages at once (which is a very reasonable ambition, though not often

realised), but they wanted to be on all sides at once: which is

nonsense. Swinburne tries to question the philosophy of Christianity in

the metres of a Christmas carol: and Dante Rossetti tries to write as if

he were Christina Rossetti. Certainly the almost successful summit of

all this attempt is Pater’s superb passage on the Mona Lisa; in which he

seeks to make her at once a mystery of good and a mystery of evil. The

philosophy is false; even evidently false, for it bears no fruit to-day.

There never was a woman, not Eve herself in the instant of temptation,

who could smile the same smile as the mother of Helen and the mother of

Mary. But it is the high-water mark of that vast attempt at an

impartiality reached through art: and no other mere artist ever rose so

high again.

Apart from this Ruskinian offshoot through Pre-Raphaelitism into what

was called Æstheticism, the remains of the inspiration of Carlyle fill a

very large part in the Victorian life, but not strictly so large a part

in the Victorian literature. Charles Kingsley was a great publicist; a

popular preacher; a popular novelist; and (in two cases at least) a very

good novelist. His Water Babies is really a breezy and roaring freak;

like a holiday at the seaside—a holiday where one talks natural history

without taking it seriously. Some of the songs in this and other of his

works are very real songs: notably, “When all the World is Young, Lad,”

which comes very near to being the only true defence of marriage in the

controversies of the nineteenth century. But when all this is allowed,

no one will seriously rank Kingsley, in the really literary sense, on

the level of Carlyle or Ruskin, Tennyson or Browning, Dickens or

Thackeray: and if such a place cannot be given to him, it can be given

even less to his lusty and pleasant friend, Tom Hughes, whose

personality floats towards the frankness of the Boy’s Own Paper; or to

his deep, suggestive metaphysical friend Maurice, who floats rather

towards The Hibbert Journal. The moral and social influence of these

things is not to be forgotten: but they leave the domain of letters. The

voice of Carlyle is not heard again in letters till the coming of

Kipling and Henley.

One other name of great importance should appear here, because it cannot

appear very appropriately anywhere else: the man hardly belonged to the

same school as Ruskin and Carlyle, but fought many of their battles, and

was even more concentrated on their main task—the task of convicting

liberal bourgeois England of priggishness and provinciality. I mean,

of course, Matthew Arnold. Against Mill’s “liberty” and Carlyle’s

“strength” and Ruskin’s “nature,” he set up a new presence and entity

which he called “culture,” the disinterested play of the mind through

the sifting of the best books and authorities. Though a little dandified

in phrase, he was undoubtedly serious and public-spirited in intention.

He sometimes talked of culture almost as if it were a man, or at least a

church (for a church has a sort of personality): some may suspect that

culture was a man, whose name was Matthew Arnold. But Arnold was not

only right but highly valuable. If we have said that Carlyle was a man

that saw things, we may add that Arnold was chiefly valuable as a man

who knew things. Well as he was endowed intellectually, his power came

more from information than intellect. He simply happened to know certain

things, that Carlyle didn’t know, that Kingsley didn’t know, that Huxley

and Herbert Spencer didn’t know: that England didn’t know. He knew that

England was a part of Europe: and not so important a part as it had been

the morning after Waterloo. He knew that England was then (as it is now)

an oligarchical State, and that many great nations are not. He knew

that a real democracy need not live and does not live in that perpetual

panic about using the powers of the State, which possessed men like

Spencer and Cobden. He knew a rational minimum of culture and common

courtesy could exist and did exist throughout large democracies. He knew

the Catholic Church had been in history “the Church of the multitude”:

he knew it was not a sect. He knew that great landlords are no more a

part of the economic law than nigger-drivers: he knew that small owners

could and did prosper. He was not so much the philosopher as the man of

the world: he reminded us that Europe was a society while Ruskin was

treating it as a picture gallery. He was a sort of Heaven-sent courier.

His frontal attack on the vulgar and sullen optimism of Victorian

utility may be summoned up in the admirable sentence, in which he asked

the English what was the use of a train taking them quickly from

Islington to Camberwell, if it only took them “from a dismal and

illiberal life in Islington to a dismal and illiberal life in

Camberwell?”

His attitude to that great religious enigma round which all these great

men were grouped as in a ring, was individual and decidedly curious. He

seems to have believed that a “Historic Church,” that is, some

established organisation with ceremonies and sacred books, etc., could

be perpetually preserved as a sort of vessel to contain the spiritual

ideas of the age, whatever those ideas might happen to be. He clearly

seems to have contemplated a melting away of the doctrines of the Church

and even of the meaning of the words: but he thought a certain need in

man would always be best satisfied by public worship and especially by

the great religious literatures of the past. He would embalm the body

that it might often be revisited by the soul—or souls. Something of the

sort has been suggested by Dr. Coit and others of the ethical societies

in our own time. But while Arnold would loosen the theological bonds of

the Church, he would not loosen the official bonds of the State. You

must not disestablish the Church: you must not even leave the Church:

you must stop inside it and think what you choose. Enemies might say

that he was simply trying to establish and endow Agnosticism. It is

fairer and truer to say that unconsciously he was trying to restore

Paganism: for this State Ritualism without theology, and without much

belief, actually was the practice of the ancient world. Arnold may have

thought that he was building an altar to the Unknown God; but he was

really building it to Divus Cæsar.

As a critic he was chiefly concerned to preserve criticism itself; to

set a measure to praise and blame and support the classics against the

fashions. It is here that it is specially true of him, if of no writer

else, that the style was the man. The most vital thing he invented was a

new style: founded on the patient unravelling of the tangled Victorian

ideas, as if they were matted hair under a comb. He did not mind how

elaborately long he made a sentence, so long as he made it clear. He

would constantly repeat whole phrases word for word in the same

sentence, rather than risk ambiguity by abbreviation. His genius showed

itself in turning this method of a laborious lucidity into a peculiarly

exasperating form of satire and controversy. Newman’s strength was in a

sort of stifled passion, a dangerous patience of polite logic and then:

“Cowards! if I advanced a step you would run away: it is not you I fear.

Di me terrent, et Jupiter hostis.” If Newman seemed suddenly to fly

into a temper, Carlyle seemed never to fly out of one. But Arnold kept a

smile of heart-broken forbearance, as of the teacher in an idiot school,

that was enormously insulting. One trick he often tried with success. If

his opponent had said something foolish, like “the destiny of England is

in the great heart of England,” Arnold would repeat the phrase again and

again until it looked more foolish than it really was. Thus he recurs

again and again to “the British College of Health in the New Road” till

the reader wants to rush out and burn the place down. Arnold’s great

error was that he sometimes thus wearied us of his own phrases, as well

as of his enemies’.

These names are roughly representative of the long series of protests

against the cold commercial rationalism which held Parliament and the

schools through the earlier Victorian time, in so far as those protests

were made in the name of neglected intellect, insulted art, forgotten

heroism and desecrated religion. But already the Utilitarian citadel had

been more heavily bombarded on the other side by one lonely and

unlettered man of genius.

The rise of Dickens is like the rising of a vast mob. This is not only

because his tales are indeed as crowded and populous as towns: for truly

it was not so much that Dickens appeared as that a hundred Dickens

characters appeared. It is also because he was the sort of man who has

the impersonal impetus of a mob: what Poe meant when he truly said that

popular rumour, if really spontaneous, was like the intuition of the

individual man of genius. Those who speak scornfully of the ignorance of

the mob do not err as to the fact itself; their error is in not seeing

that just as a crowd is comparatively ignorant, so a crowd is

comparatively innocent. It will have the old and human faults; but it is

not likely to specialise in the special faults of that particular

society: because the effort of the strong and successful in all ages is

to keep the poor out of society. If the higher castes have developed

some special moral beauty or grace, as they occasionally do (for

instance, mediæval chivalry), it is likely enough, of course, that the

mass of men will miss it. But if they have developed some perversion or

over-emphasis, as they much more often do (for instance, the Renaissance

poisoning), then it will be the tendency of the mass of men to miss that

too. The point might be put in many ways; you may say if you will that

the poor are always at the tail of the procession, and that whether they

are morally worse or better depends on whether humanity as a whole is

proceeding towards heaven or hell. When humanity is going to hell, the

poor are always nearest to heaven.

Dickens was a mob—and a mob in revolt; he fought by the light of

nature; he had not a theory, but a thirst. If any one chooses to offer

the cheap sarcasm that his thirst was largely a thirst for milk-punch, I

am content to reply with complete gravity and entire contempt that in a

sense this is perfectly true. His thirst was for things as humble, as

human, as laughable as that daily bread for which we cry to God. He had

no particular plan of reform; or, when he had, it was startlingly petty

and parochial compared with the deep, confused clamour of comradeship

and insurrection that fills all his narrative. It would not be gravely

unjust to him to compare him to his own heroine, Arabella Allen, who

“didn’t know what she did like,” but who (when confronted with Mr. Bob

Sawyer) “did know what she didn’t like.” Dickens did know what he didn’t

like. He didn’t like the Unrivalled Happiness which Mr. Roebuck praised;

the economic laws that were working so faultlessly in Fever Alley; the

wealth that was accumulating so rapidly in Bleeding Heart Yard. But,

above all, he didn’t like the mean side of the Manchester philosophy:

the preaching of an impossible thrift and an intolerable temperance. He

hated the implication that because a man was a miser in Latin he must

also be a miser in English. And this meanness of the Utilitarians had

gone very far—infecting many finer minds who had fought the

Utilitarians. In the Edinburgh Review, a thing like Malthus could be

championed by a man like Macaulay.

The twin root facts of the revolution called Dickens are these: first,

that he attacked the cold Victorian compromise; second, that he

attacked it without knowing he was doing it—certainly without knowing

that other people were doing it. He was attacking something which we

will call Mr. Gradgrind. He was utterly unaware (in any essential sense)

that any one else had attacked Mr. Gradgrind. All the other attacks had

come from positions of learning or cultured eccentricity of which he was

entirely ignorant, and to which, therefore (like a spirited fellow), he

felt a furious hostility. Thus, for instance, he hated that Little

Bethel to which Kit’s mother went: he hated it simply as Kit hated it.

Newman could have told him it was hateful, because it had no root in

religious history; it was not even a sapling sprung of the seed of some

great human and heathen tree: it was a monstrous mushroom that grows in

the moonshine and dies in the dawn. Dickens knew no more of religious

history than Kit; he simply smelt the fungus, and it stank. Thus, again,

he hated that insolent luxury of a class counting itself a comfortable

exception to all mankind; he hated it as Kate Nickleby hated Sir

Mulberry Hawke—by instinct. Carlyle could have told him that all the

world was full of that anger against the impudent fatness of the few.

But when Dickens wrote about Kate Nickleby, he knew about as much of the

world—as Kate Nickleby. He did write The Tale of Two Cities long

afterwards; but that was when he had been instructed by Carlyle. His

first revolutionism was as private and internal as feeling sea-sick.

Thus, once more, he wrote against Mr. Gradgrind long before he created

him. In The Chimes, conceived in quite his casual and charitable

season, with the Christmas Carol and the Cricket on the Hearth, he

hit hard at the economists. Ruskin, in the same fashion, would have told

him that the worst thing about the economists was that they were not

economists: that they missed many essential things even in economics.

But Dickens did not know whether they were economists or not: he only

knew that they wanted hitting. Thus, to take a last case out of many,

Dickens travelled in a French railway train, and noticed that this

eccentric nation provided him with wine that he could drink and

sandwiches he could eat, and manners he could tolerate. And remembering

the ghastly sawdust-eating waiting-rooms of the North English railways,

he wrote that rich chapter in Mugby Junction. Matthew Arnold could

have told him that this was but a part of the general thinning down of

European civilisation in these islands at the edge of it; that for two

or three thousand years the Latin society has learnt how to drink wine,

and how not to drink too much of it. Dickens did not in the least

understand the Latin society: but he did understand the wine. If (to

prolong an idle but not entirely false metaphor) we have called Carlyle

a man who saw and Arnold a man who knew, we might truly call Dickens a

man who tasted, that is, a man who really felt. In spite of all the

silly talk about his vulgarity, he really had, in the strict and

serious sense, good taste. All real good taste is gusto—the power of

appreciating the presence—or the absence—of a particular and positive

pleasure. He had no learning; he was not misled by the label on the

bottle—for that is what learning largely meant in his time. He opened

his mouth and shut his eyes and saw what the Age of Reason would give

him. And, having tasted it, he spat it out.

I am constrained to consider Dickens here among the fighters; though I

ought (on the pure principles of Art) to be considering him in the

chapter which I have allotted to the story-tellers. But we should get

the whole Victorian perspective wrong, in my opinion at least, if we did

not see that Dickens was primarily the most successful of all the

onslaughts on the solid scientific school; because he did not attack

from the standpoint of extraordinary faith, like Newman; or the

standpoint of extraordinary inspiration, like Carlyle; or the standpoint

of extraordinary detachment or serenity, like Arnold; but from the

standpoint of quite ordinary and quite hearty dislike. To give but one

instance more, Matthew Arnold, trying to carry into England constructive

educational schemes which he could see spread like a clear railway map

all over the Continent, was much badgered about what he really thought

was wrong with English middle-class education. Despairing of

explaining to the English middle class the idea of high and central

public instruction, as distinct from coarse and hole-and-corner private

instruction, he invoked the aid of Dickens. He said the English

middle-class school was the sort of school where Mr. Creakle sat, with

his buttered toast and his cane. Now Dickens had probably never seen any

other kind of school—certainly he had never understood the systematic

State Schools in which Arnold had learnt his lesson. But he saw the cane

and the buttered toast, and he knew that it was all wrong. In this

sense, Dickens, the great romanticist, is truly the great realist also.

For he had no abstractions: he had nothing except realities out of which

to make a romance.

With Dickens, then, re-arises that reality with which I began and which

(curtly, but I think not falsely) I have called Cobbett. In dealing with

fiction as such, I shall have occasion to say wherein Dickens is weaker

and stronger than that England of the eighteenth century: here it is

sufficient to say that he represents the return of Cobbett in this vital

sense; that he is proud of being the ordinary man. No one can understand

the thousand caricatures by Dickens who does not understand that he is

comparing them all with his own common sense. Dickens, in the bulk,

liked the things that Cobbett had liked; what is perhaps more to the

point, he hated the things that Cobbett had hated; the Tudors, the

lawyers, the leisurely oppression of the poor. Cobbett’s fine fighting

journalism had been what is nowadays called “personal,” that is, it

supposed human beings to be human. But Cobbett was also personal in the

less satisfactory sense; he could only multiply monsters who were

exaggerations of his enemies or exaggerations of himself. Dickens was

personal in a more godlike sense; he could multiply persons. He could

create all the farce and tragedy of his age over again, with creatures

unborn to sin and creatures unborn to suffer. That which had not been

achieved by the fierce facts of Cobbett, the burning dreams of Carlyle,

the white-hot proofs of Newman, was really or very nearly achieved by a

crowd of impossible people. In the centre stood that citadel of atheist

industrialism: and if indeed it has ever been taken, it was taken by the

rush of that unreal army.

CHAPTER II

THE GREAT VICTORIAN NOVELISTS

The Victorian novel was a thing entirely Victorian; quite unique and

suited to a sort of cosiness in that country and that age. But the novel

itself, though not merely Victorian, is mainly modern. No clear-headed

person wastes his time over definitions, except where he thinks his own

definition would probably be in dispute. I merely say, therefore, that

when I say “novel,” I mean a fictitious narrative (almost invariably,

but not necessarily, in prose) of which the essential is that the story

is not told for the sake of its naked pointedness as an anecdote, or for

the sake of the irrelevant landscapes and visions that can be caught up

in it, but for the sake of some study of the difference between human

beings. There are several things that make this mode of art unique. One

of the most conspicuous is that it is the art in which the conquests of

woman are quite beyond controversy. The proposition that Victorian women

have done well in politics and philosophy is not necessarily an untrue

proposition; but it is a partisan proposition. I never heard that many

women, let alone men, shared the views of Mary Wollstonecraft; I never

heard that millions of believers flocked to the religion tentatively

founded by Miss Frances Power Cobbe. They did, undoubtedly, flock to

Mrs. Eddy; but it will not be unfair to that lady to call her following

a sect, and not altogether unreasonable to say that such insane

exceptions prove the rule. Nor can I at this moment think of a single

modern woman writing on politics or abstract things, whose work is of

undisputed importance; except perhaps Mrs. Sidney Webb, who settles

things by the simple process of ordering about the citizens of a state,

as she might the servants in a kitchen. There has been, at any rate, no

writer on moral or political theory that can be mentioned, without

seeming comic, in the same breath with the great female novelists. But

when we come to the novelists, the women have, on the whole, equality;

and certainly, in some points, superiority. Jane Austen is as strong in

her own way as Scott is in his. But she is, for all practical purposes,

never weak in her own way—and Scott very often is. Charlotte Brontë

dedicated Jane Eyre to the author of Vanity Fair. I should hesitate

to say that Charlotte Brontë’s is a better book than Thackeray’s, but I

think it might well be maintained that it is a better story. All sorts

of inquiring asses (equally ignorant of the old nature of woman and the

new nature of the novel) whispered wisely that George Eliot’s novels

were really written by George Lewes. I will cheerfully answer for the

fact that, if they had been written by George Lewes, no one would ever

have read them. Those who have read his book on Robespierre will have

no doubt about my meaning. I am no idolater of George Eliot; but a man

who could concoct such a crushing opiate about the most exciting

occasion in history certainly did not write The Mill on the Floss.

This is the first fact about the novel, that it is the introduction of a

new and rather curious kind of art; and it has been found to be

peculiarly feminine, from the first good novel by Fanny Burney to the

last good novel by Miss May Sinclair. The truth is, I think, that the

modern novel is a new thing; not new in its essence (for that is a

philosophy for fools), but new in the sense that it lets loose many of

the things that are old. It is a hearty and exhaustive overhauling of

that part of human existence which has always been the woman’s province,

or rather kingdom; the play of personalities in private, the real

difference between Tommy and Joe. It is right that womanhood should

specialise in individuals, and be praised for doing so; just as in the

Middle Ages she specialised in dignity and was praised for doing so.

People put the matter wrong when they say that the novel is a study of

human nature. Human nature is a thing that even men can understand.

Human nature is born of the pain of a woman; human nature plays at

peep-bo when it is two and at cricket when it is twelve; human nature

earns its living and desires the other sex and dies. What the novel

deals with is what women have to deal with; the differentiations, the

twists and turns of this eternal river. The key of this new form of art,

which we call fiction, is sympathy. And sympathy does not mean so much

feeling with all who feel, but rather suffering with all who suffer. And

it was inevitable, under such an inspiration, that more attention should

be given to the awkward corners of life than to its even flow. The very

promising domestic channel dug by the Victorian women, in books like

Cranford, by Mrs. Gaskell, would have got to the sea, if they had been

left alone to dig it. They might have made domesticity a fairyland.

Unfortunately another idea, the idea of imitating men’s cuffs and

collars and documents, cut across this purely female discovery and

destroyed it.

It may seem mere praise of the novel to say it is the art of sympathy

and the study of human variations. But indeed, though this is a good

thing, it is not universally good. We have gained in sympathy; but we

have lost in brotherhood. Old quarrels had more equality than modern

exonerations. Two peasants in the Middle Ages quarrelled about their two

fields. But they went to the same church, served in the same semi-feudal

militia, and had the same morality, which ever might happen to be

breaking it at the moment. The very cause of their quarrel was the cause

of their fraternity; they both liked land. But suppose one of them a

teetotaler who desired the abolition of hops on both farms; suppose the

other a vegetarian who desired the abolition of chickens on both farms:

and it is at once apparent that a quarrel of quite a different kind

would begin; and that in that quarrel it would not be a question of

farmer against farmer, but of individual against individual. This

fundamental sense of human fraternity can only exist in the presence of

positive religion. Man is merely man only when he is seen against the

sky. If he is seen against any landscape, he is only a man of that land.

If he is seen against any house, he is only a householder. Only where

death and eternity are intensely present can human beings fully feel

their fellowship. Once the divine darkness against which we stand is

really dismissed from the mind (as it was very nearly dismissed in the

Victorian time) the differences between human beings become

overpoweringly plain; whether they are expressed in the high caricatures

of Dickens or the low lunacies of Zola.

This can be seen in a sort of picture in the Prologue of the _Canterbury

Tales_; which is already pregnant with the promise of the English novel.

The characters there are at once graphically and delicately

differentiated; the Doctor with his rich cloak, his careful meals, his

coldness to religion; the Franklin, whose white beard was so fresh that

it recalled the daisies, and in whose house it snowed meat and drink;

the Summoner, from whose fearful face, like a red cherub’s, the children

fled, and who wore a garland like a hoop; the Miller with his short red

hair and bagpipes and brutal head, with which he could break down a

door; the Lover who was as sleepless as a nightingale; the Knight, the

Cook, the Clerk of Oxford. Pendennis or the Cook, M. Mirabolant, is

nowhere so vividly varied by a few merely verbal strokes. But the great

difference is deeper and more striking. It is simply that Pendennis

would never have gone riding with a cook at all. Chaucer’s knight rode

with a cook quite naturally; because the thing they were all seeking

together was as much above knighthood as it was above cookery. Soldiers

and swindlers and bullies and outcasts, they were all going to the

shrine of a distant saint. To what sort of distant saint would Pendennis

and Colonel Newcome and Mr. Moss and Captain Costigan and Ridley the

butler and Bayham and Sir Barnes Newcome and Laura and the Duchess

d’Ivry and Warrington and Captain Blackball and Lady Kew travel,

laughing and telling tales together?

The growth of the novel, therefore, must not be too easily called an

increase in the interest in humanity. It is an increase in the interest

in the things in which men differ; much fuller and finer work had been

done before about the things in which they agree. And this intense

interest in variety had its bad side as well as its good; it has rather

increased social distinctions in a serious and spiritual sense. Most of

the oblivion of democracy is due to the oblivion of death. But in its

own manner and measure, it was a real advance and experiment of the

European mind, like the public art of the Renaissance or the fairyland

of physical science explored in the nineteenth century. It was a more

unquestionable benefit than these: and in that development women played

a peculiar part, English women especially, and Victorian women most of

all.

It is perhaps partly, though certainly not entirely, this influence of

the great women writers that explains another very arresting and

important fact about the emergence of genuinely Victorian fiction. It

had been by this time decided, by the powers that had influence (and by

public opinion also, at least in the middle-class sense), that certain

verbal limits must be set to such literature. The novel must be what

some would call pure and others would call prudish; but what is not,

properly considered, either one or the other: it is rather a more or

less business proposal (right or wrong) that every writer shall draw the

line at literal physical description of things socially concealed. It

was originally merely verbal; it had not, primarily, any dream of

purifying the topic or the moral tone. Dickens and Thackeray claimed

very properly the right to deal with shameful passions and suggest their

shameful culminations; Scott sometimes dealt with ideas positively

horrible—as in that grand Glenallan tragedy which is as appalling as

the OEdipus or The Cenci. None of these great men would have

tolerated for a moment being talked to (as the muddle-headed amateur

censors talk to artists to-day) about “wholesome” topics and suggestions

“that cannot elevate.” They had to describe the great battle of good and

evil and they described both; but they accepted a working Victorian

compromise about what should happen behind the scenes and what on the

stage. Dickens did not claim the license of diction Fielding might have

claimed in repeating the senile ecstasies of Gride (let us say) over his

purchased bride: but Dickens does not leave the reader in the faintest

doubt about what sort of feelings they were; nor is there any reason why

he should. Thackeray would not have described the toilet details of the

secret balls of Lord Steyne: he left that to Lady Cardigan. But no one

who had read Thackeray’s version would be surprised at Lady Cardigan’s.

But though the great Victorian novelists would not have permitted the

impudence of the suggestion that every part of their problem must be

wholesome and innocent in itself, it is still tenable (I do not say it

is certain) that by yielding to the Philistines on this verbal

compromise, they have in the long run worked for impurity rather than

purity. In one point I do certainly think that Victorian Bowdlerism did

pure harm. This is the simple point that, nine times out of ten, the

coarse word is the word that condemns an evil and the refined word the

word that excuses it. A common evasion, for instance, substitutes for

the word that brands self-sale as the essential sin, a word which weakly

suggests that it is no more wicked than walking down the street. The

great peril of such soft mystifications is that extreme evils (they

that are abnormal even by the standard of evil) have a very long start.

Where ordinary wrong is made unintelligible, extraordinary wrong can

count on remaining more unintelligible still; especially among those who

live in such an atmosphere of long words. It is a cruel comment on the

purity of the Victorian Age, that the age ended (save for the bursting

of a single scandal) in a thing being everywhere called “Art,” “The

Greek Spirit,” “The Platonic Ideal” and so on—which any navvy mending

the road outside would have stamped with a word as vile and as vulgar as

it deserved.

This reticence, right or wrong, may have been connected with the

participation of women with men in the matter of fiction. It is an

important point: the sexes can only be coarse separately. It was

certainly also due, as I have already suggested, to the treaty between

the rich bourgeoisie and the old aristocracy, which both had to make,

for the common and congenial purpose of keeping the English people

down. But it was due much more than this to a general moral atmosphere

in the Victorian Age. It is impossible to express that spirit except by

the electric bell of a name. It was latitudinarian, and yet it was

limited. It could be content with nothing less than the whole cosmos:

yet the cosmos with which it was content was small. It is false to say

it was without humour: yet there was something by instinct unsmiling in

it. It was always saying solidly that things were “enough”; and proving

by that sharpness (as of the shutting of a door) that they were not

enough. It took, I will not say its pleasures, but even its

emancipations, sadly. Definitions seem to escape this way and that in

the attempt to locate it as an idea. But every one will understand me if

I call it George Eliot.

I begin with this great woman of letters for both the two reasons

already mentioned. She represents the rationalism of the old Victorian

Age at its highest. She and Mill are like two great mountains at the end

of that long, hard chain which is the watershed of the Early Victorian

time. They alone rise high enough to be confused among the clouds—or

perhaps confused among the stars. They certainly were seeking truth, as

Newman and Carlyle were; the slow slope of the later Victorian vulgarity

does not lower their precipice and pinnacle. But I begin with this name

also because it emphasises the idea of modern fiction as a fresh and

largely a female thing. The novel of the nineteenth century was female;

as fully as the novel of the eighteenth century was male. It is quite

certain that no woman could have written Roderick Random. It is not

quite so certain that no woman could have written Esmond. The strength

and subtlety of woman had certainly sunk deep into English letters when

George Eliot began to write.

Her originals and even her contemporaries had shown the feminine power

in fiction as well or better than she. Charlotte Brontë, understood

along her own instincts, was as great; Jane Austen was greater. The

latter comes into our present consideration only as that most

exasperating thing, an ideal unachieved. It is like leaving an

unconquered fortress in the rear. No woman later has captured the

complete common sense of Jane Austen. She could keep her head, while all

the after women went about looking for their brains. She could describe

a man coolly; which neither George Eliot nor Charlotte Brontë could do.

She knew what she knew, like a sound dogmatist: she did not know what

she did not know—like a sound agnostic. But she belongs to a vanished

world before the great progressive age of which I write.

One of the characteristics of the central Victorian spirit was a

tendency to substitute a certain more or less satisfied seriousness for

the extremes of tragedy and comedy. This is marked by a certain change

in George Eliot; as it is marked by a certain limitation or moderation

in Dickens. Dickens was the People, as it was in the eighteenth century

and still largely is, in spite of all the talk for and against Board

School Education: comic, tragic, realistic, free-spoken, far looser in

words than in deeds. It marks the silent strength and pressure of the

spirit of the Victorian middle class that even to Dickens it never

occurred to revive the verbal coarseness of Smollett or Swift. The other

proof of the same pressure is the change in George Eliot. She was not a

genius in the elemental sense of Dickens; she could never have been

either so strong or so soft. But she did originally represent some of

the same popular realities: and her first books (at least as compared

with her latest) were full of sound fun and bitter pathos. Mr. Max

Beerbohm has remarked (in his glorious essay called Ichabod, I think),

that Silas Marner would not have forgotten his miserliness if George

Eliot had written of him in her maturity. I have a great regard for Mr.

Beerbohm’s literary judgments; and it may be so. But if literature

means anything more than a cold calculation of the chances, if there is

in it, as I believe, any deeper idea of detaching the spirit of life

from the dull obstacles of life, of permitting human nature really to

reveal itself as human, if (to put it shortly) literature has anything

on earth to do with being interesting—then I think we would rather

have a few more Marners than that rich maturity that gave us the

analysed dust-heaps of Daniel Deronda.

In her best novels there is real humour, of a cool sparkling sort; there

is a strong sense of substantial character that has not yet degenerated

into psychology; there is a great deal of wisdom, chiefly about women;

indeed there is almost every element of literature except a certain

indescribable thing called glamour; which was the whole stock-in-trade

of the Brontës, which we feel in Dickens when Quilp clambers amid rotten

wood by the desolate river; and even in Thackeray when Esmond with his

melancholy eyes wanders like some swarthy crow about the dismal avenues

of Castlewood. Of this quality (which some have called, but hastily, the

essential of literature) George Eliot had not little but nothing. Her

air is bright and intellectually even exciting; but it is like the air

of a cloudless day on the parade at Brighton. She sees people clearly,

but not through an atmosphere. And she can conjure up storms in the

conscious, but not in the subconscious mind.

It is true (though the idea should not be exaggerated) that this

deficiency was largely due to her being cut off from all those

conceptions that had made the fiction of a Muse; the deep idea that

there are really demons and angels behind men. Certainly the increasing

atheism of her school spoilt her own particular imaginative talent: she

was far less free when she thought like Ladislaw than when she thought

like Casaubon. It also betrayed her on a matter specially requiring

common sense; I mean sex. There is nothing that is so profoundly false

as rationalist flirtation. Each sex is trying to be both sexes at once;

and the result is a confusion more untruthful than any conventions. This

can easily be seen by comparing her with a greater woman who died before

the beginning of our present problem. Jane Austen was born before those

bonds which (we are told) protected woman from truth, were burst by the

Brontës or elaborately untied by George Eliot. Yet the fact remains that

Jane Austen knew much more about men than either of them. Jane Austen

may have been protected from truth: but it was precious little of truth

that was protected from her. When Darcy, in finally confessing his

faults, says, “I have been a selfish being all my life, in practice

though not in theory,” he gets nearer to a complete confession of the

intelligent male than ever was even hinted by the Byronic lapses of the

Brontës’ heroes or the elaborate exculpations of George Eliot’s. Jane

Austen, of course, covered an infinitely smaller field than any of her

later rivals; but I have always believed in the victory of small

nationalities.

The Brontës suggest themselves here; because their superficial

qualities, the qualities that can be seized upon in satire, were in this

an exaggeration of what was, in George Eliot, hardly more than an

omission. There was perhaps a time when Mr. Rawjester was more widely

known than Mr. Rochester. And certainly Mr. Rochester (to adopt the

diction of that other eminent country gentleman, Mr. Darcy) was simply

individualistic not only in practice, but in theory. Now any one may be

so in practice: but a man who is simply individualistic in theory must

merely be an ass. Undoubtedly the Brontës exposed themselves to some

misunderstanding by thus perpetually making the masculine creature much

more masculine than he wants to be. Thackeray (a man of strong though

sleepy virility) asked in his exquisite plaintive way: “Why do our lady

novelists make the men bully the women?” It is, I think, unquestionably

true that the Brontës treated the male as an almost anarchic thing

coming in from outside nature; much as people on this planet regard a

comet. Even the really delicate and sustained comedy of Paul Emanuel is

not quite free from this air of studying something alien. The reply may

be made that the women in men’s novels are equally fallacious. The reply

is probably just.

What the Brontës really brought into fiction was exactly what Carlyle

brought into history; the blast of the mysticism of the North. They were

of Irish blood settled on the windy heights of Yorkshire; in that

country where Catholicism lingered latest, but in a superstitious form;

where modern industrialism came earliest and was more superstitious

still. The strong winds and sterile places, the old tyranny of barons

and the new and blacker tyranny of manufacturers, has made and left that

country a land of barbarians. All Charlotte Brontë’s earlier work is

full of that sullen and unmanageable world; moss-troopers turned

hurriedly into miners; the last of the old world forced into supporting

the very first crudities of the new. In this way Charlotte Brontë

represents the Victorian settlement in a special way. The Early

Victorian Industrialism is to George Eliot and to Charlotte Brontë,

rather as the Late Victorian Imperialism would have been to Mrs. Humphry

Ward in the centre of the empire and to Miss Olive Schreiner at the edge

of it. The real strength there is in characters like Robert Moore, when

he is dealing with anything except women, is the romance of industry in

its first advance: a romance that has not remained. On such fighting

frontiers people always exaggerate the strong qualities the masculine

sex does possess, and always add a great many strong qualities that it

does not possess. That is, briefly, all the reason in the Brontës on

this special subject: the rest is stark unreason. It can be most clearly

seen in that sister of Charlotte Brontë’s who has achieved the real

feat of remaining as a great woman rather than a great writer. There is

really, in a narrow but intense way, a tradition of Emily Brontë: as

there is a tradition of St. Peter or Dr. Johnson. People talk as if they

had known her, apart from her works. She must have been something more

than an original person; perhaps an origin. But so far as her written

works go she enters English letters only as an original person—and

rather a narrow one. Her imagination was sometimes superhuman—always

inhuman. Wuthering Heights might have been written by an eagle. She is

the strongest instance of these strong imaginations that made the other

sex a monster: for Heathcliffe fails as a man as catastrophically as he

succeeds as a demon. I think Emily Brontë was further narrowed by the

broadness of her religious views; but never, of course, so much as

George Eliot.

In any case, it is Charlotte Brontë who enters Victorian literature. The

shortest way of stating her strong contribution is, I think, this: that

she reached the highest romance through the lowest realism. She did not

set out with Amadis of Gaul in a forest or with Mr. Pickwick in a comic

club. She set out with herself, with her own dingy clothes, and

accidental ugliness, and flat, coarse, provincial household; and

forcibly fused all such muddy materials into a spirited fairy-tale. If

the first chapters on the home and school had not proved how heavy and

hateful sanity can be, there would really be less point in the

insanity of Mr. Rochester’s wife—or the not much milder insanity of

Mrs. Rochester’s husband. She discovered the secret of hiding the

sensational in the commonplace: and Jane Eyre remains the best of her

books (better even than Villette) because while it is a human document

written in blood, it is also one of the best blood-and-thunder detective

stories in the world.

But while Emily Brontë was as unsociable as a storm at midnight, and

while Charlotte Brontë was at best like that warmer and more domestic

thing, a house on fire—they do connect themselves with the calm of

George Eliot, as the forerunners of many later developments of the

feminine advance. Many forerunners (if it comes to that) would have felt

rather ill if they had seen the things they foreran. This notion of a

hazy anticipation of after history has been absurdly overdone: as when

men connect Chaucer with the Reformation; which is like connecting Homer

with the Syracusan Expedition. But it is to some extent true that all

these great Victorian women had a sort of unrest in their souls. And the

proof of it is that (after what I will claim to call the healthier time

of Dickens and Thackeray) it began to be admitted by the great Victorian

men. If there had not been something in that irritation, we should

hardly have had to speak in these pages of Diana of the Crossways or

of Tess of the D’Urbervilles. To what this strange and very local sex

war has been due I shall not ask, because I have no answer. That it was

due to votes or even little legal inequalities about marriage, I feel

myself here too close to realities even to discuss. My own guess is that

it has been due to the great neglect of the military spirit by the male

Victorians. The woman felt obscurely that she was still running her

mortal risk, while the man was not still running his. But I know nothing

about it; nor does anybody else.

In so short a book on so vast, complex and living a subject, it is

impossible to drop even into the second rank of good authors, whose name

is legion; but it is impossible to leave that considerable female force

in fiction which has so largely made the very nature of the modern

novel, without mentioning two names which almost brought that second

rank up to the first rank. They were at utterly opposite poles. The one

succeeded by being a much mellower and more Christian George Eliot; the

other succeeded by being a much more mad and unchristian Emily Brontë.

But Mrs. Oliphant and the author calling herself “Ouida” both forced

themselves well within the frontier of fine literature. _The Beleaguered

City_ is literature in its highest sense; the other works of its author

tend to fall into fiction in its best working sense. Mrs. Oliphant was

infinitely saner in that city of ghosts than the cosmopolitan Ouida ever

was in any of the cities of men. Mrs. Oliphant would never have dared to

discover, either in heaven or hell, such a thing as a hairbrush with its

back encrusted with diamonds. But though Ouida was violent and weak

where Mrs. Oliphant might have been mild and strong, her own triumphs

were her own. She had a real power of expressing the senses through her

style; of conveying the very heat of blue skies or the bursting of

palpable pomegranates. And just as Mrs. Oliphant transfused her more

timid Victorian tales with a true and intense faith in the Christian

mystery—so Ouida, with infinite fury and infinite confusion of

thought, did fill her books with Byron and the remains of the French

Revolution. In the track of such genius there has been quite an

accumulation of true talent as in the children’s tales of Mrs. Ewing,

the historical tales of Miss Yonge, the tales of Mrs. Molesworth, and so

on. On a general review I do not think I have been wrong in taking the

female novelists first. I think they gave its special shape, its

temporary twist, to the Victorian novel.

Nevertheless it is a shock (I almost dare to call it a relief) to come

back to the males. It is the more abrupt because the first name that

must be mentioned derives directly from the mere maleness of the Sterne

and Smollett novel. I have already spoken of Dickens as the most homely

and instinctive, and therefore probably the heaviest, of all the

onslaughts made on the central Victorian satisfaction. There is

therefore the less to say of him here, where we consider him only as a

novelist; but there is still much more to say than can even conceivably

be said. Dickens, as we have stated, inherited the old comic, rambling

novel from Smollett and the rest. Dickens, as we have also stated,

consented to expurgate that novel. But when all origins and all

restraints have been defined and allowed for, the creature that came out

was such as we shall not see again. Smollett was coarse; but Smollett

was also cruel. Dickens was frequently horrible; he was never cruel. The

art of Dickens was the most exquisite of arts: it was the art of

enjoying everybody. Dickens, being a very human writer, had to be a very

human being; he had his faults and sensibilities in a strong degree; and

I do not for a moment maintain that he enjoyed everybody in his daily

life. But he enjoyed everybody in his books: and everybody has enjoyed

everybody in those books even till to-day. His books are full of baffled

villains stalking out or cowardly bullies kicked downstairs. But the

villains and the cowards are such delightful people that the reader

always hopes the villain will put his head through a side window and

make a last remark; or that the bully will say one thing more, even from

the bottom of the stairs. The reader really hopes this; and he cannot

get rid of the fancy that the author hopes so too. I cannot at the

moment recall that Dickens ever killed a comic villain, except Quilp,

who was deliberately made even more villainous than comic. There can be

no serious fears for the life of Mr. Wegg in the muckcart; though Mr.

Pecksniff fell to be a borrower of money, and Mr. Mantalini to turning a

mangle, the human race has the comfort of thinking they are still alive:

and one might have the rapture of receiving a begging letter from Mr.

Pecksniff, or even of catching Mr. Mantalini collecting the washing, if

one always lurked about on Monday mornings. This sentiment (the true

artist will be relieved to hear) is entirely unmoral. Mrs. Wilfer

deserved death much more than Mr. Quilp, for she had succeeded in

poisoning family life persistently, while he was (to say the least of

it) intermittent in his domesticity. But who can honestly say he does

not hope Mrs. Wilfer is still talking like Mrs. Wilfer—especially if it

is only in a book? This is the artistic greatness of Dickens, before and

after which there is really nothing to be said. He had the power of

creating people, both possible and impossible, who were simply precious

and priceless people; and anything subtler added to that truth really

only weakens it.

The mention of Mrs. Wilfer (whom the heart is loth to leave) reminds one

of the only elementary ethical truth that is essential in the study of

Dickens. That is that he had broad or universal sympathies in a sense

totally unknown to the social reformers who wallow in such phrases.

Dickens (unlike the social reformers) really did sympathise with every

sort of victim of every sort of tyrant. He did truly pray for all who

are desolate and oppressed. If you try to tie him to any cause narrower

than that Prayer Book definition, you will find you have shut out half

his best work. If, in your sympathy for Mrs. Quilp, you call Dickens the

champion of downtrodden woman, you will suddenly remember Mr. Wilfer,

and find yourself unable to deny the existence of downtrodden man. If in

your sympathy for Mr. Rouncewell you call Dickens the champion of a

manly middle-class Liberalism against Chesney Wold, you will suddenly

remember Stephen Blackpool—and find yourself unable to deny that Mr.

Rouncewell might be a pretty insupportable cock on his own dung-hill. If

in your sympathy for Stephen Blackpool you call Dickens a Socialist (as

does Mr. Pugh), and think of him as merely heralding the great

Collectivist revolt against Victorian Individualism and Capitalism,

which seemed so clearly to be the crisis at the end of this epoch—you

will suddenly remember the agreeable young Barnacle at the

Circumlocution Office: and you will be unable, for very shame, to

assert that Dickens would have trusted the poor to a State Department.

Dickens did not merely believe in the brotherhood of men in the weak

modern way; he was the brotherhood of men, and knew it was a brotherhood

in sin as well as in aspiration. And he was not only larger than the old

factions he satirised; he was larger than any of our great social

schools that have gone forward since he died.

The seemingly quaint custom of comparing Dickens and Thackeray existed

in their own time, and no one will dismiss it with entire disdain who

remembers that the Victorian tradition was domestic and genuine, even

when it was hoodwinked and unworldly. There must have been some reason

for making this imaginary duel between two quite separate and quite

amiable acquaintances. And there is, after all, some reason for it. It

is not, as was once cheaply said, that Thackeray went in for truth, and

Dickens for mere caricature. There is a huge accumulation of truth,

down to the smallest detail, in Dickens: he seems sometimes a mere

mountain of facts. Thackeray, in comparison, often seems quite careless

and elusive; almost as if he did not quite know where all his characters

were. There is a truth behind the popular distinction; but it lies much

deeper. Perhaps the best way of stating it is this: that Dickens used

reality, while aiming at an effect of romance; while Thackeray used the

loose language and ordinary approaches of romance, while aiming at an

effect of reality. It was the special and splendid business of Dickens

to introduce us to people who would have been quite incredible if he had

not told us so much truth about them. It was the special and not less

splendid task of Thackeray to introduce us to people whom we knew

already. Paradoxically, but very practically, it followed that his

introductions were the longer of the two. When we hear of Aunt Betsy

Trotwood, we vividly envisage everything about her, from her gardening

gloves to her seaside residence, from her hard, handsome face to her

tame lunatic laughing at the bedroom window. It is all so minutely true

that she must be true also. We only feel inclined to walk round the

English coast until we find that particular garden and that particular

aunt. But when we turn from the aunt of Copperfield to the uncle of

Pendennis, we are more likely to run round the coast trying to find a

watering-place where he isn’t than one where he is. The moment one sees

Major Pendennis, one sees a hundred Major Pendennises. It is not a

matter of mere realism. Miss Trotwood’s bonnet and gardening tools and

cupboard full of old-fashioned bottles are quite as true in the

materialistic way as the Major’s cuffs and corner table and toast and

newspaper. Both writers are realistic: but Dickens writes realism in

order to make the incredible credible. Thackeray writes it in order to

make us recognise an old friend. Whether we shall be pleased to meet the

old friend is quite another matter: I think we should be better pleased

to meet Miss Trotwood, and find, as David Copperfield did, a new friend,

a new world. But we recognise Major Pendennis even when we avoid him.

Henceforth Thackeray can count on our seeing him from his wig to his

well-blacked boots whenever he chooses to say “Major Pendennis paid a

call.” Dickens, on the other hand, had to keep up an incessant

excitement about his characters; and no man on earth but he could have

kept it up.

It may be said, in approximate summary, that Thackeray is the novelist

of memory—of our memories as well as his own. Dickens seems to expect

all his characters, like amusing strangers arriving at lunch: as if they

gave him not only pleasure, but surprise. But Thackeray is everybody’s

past—is everybody’s youth. Forgotten friends flit about the passages of

dreamy colleges and unremembered clubs; we hear fragments of unfinished

conversations, we see faces without names for an instant, fixed for ever

in some trivial grimace: we smell the strong smell of social cliques

now quite incongruous to us; and there stir in all the little rooms at

once the hundred ghosts of oneself.

For this purpose Thackeray was equipped with a singularly easy and

sympathetic style, carved in slow soft curves where Dickens hacked out

his images with a hatchet. There was a sort of avuncular indulgence

about his attitude; what he called his “preaching” was at worst a sort

of grumbling, ending with the sentiment that boys will be boys and that

there’s nothing new under the sun. He was not really either a cynic or a

censor morum; but (in another sense than Chaucer’s) a gentle pardoner:

having seen the weaknesses he is sometimes almost weak about them. He

really comes nearer to exculpating Pendennis or Ethel Newcome than any

other author, who saw what he saw, would have been. The rare wrath of

such men is all the more effective; and there are passages in _Vanity

Fair_ and still more in The Book of Snobs, where he does make the

dance of wealth and fashion look stiff and monstrous, like a Babylonian

masquerade. But he never quite did it in such a way as to turn the

course of the Victorian Age.

It may seem strange to say that Thackeray did not know enough of the

world; yet this was the truth about him in large matters of the

philosophy of life, and especially of his own time. He did not know the

way things were going: he was too Victorian to understand the Victorian

epoch. He did not know enough ignorant people to have heard the news. In

one of his delightful asides he imagines two little clerks commenting

erroneously on the appearance of Lady Kew or Sir Brian Newcome in the

Park, and says: “How should Jones and Brown, who are not, _vous

comprenez, du monde_, understand these mysteries?” But I think Thackeray

knew quite as little about Jones and Brown as they knew about Newcome

and Kew; his world was le monde. Hence he seemed to take it for

granted that the Victorian compromise would last; while Dickens (who

knew his Jones and Brown) had already guessed that it would not.

Thackeray did not realise that the Victorian platform was a moving

platform. To take but one instance, he was a Radical like Dickens; all

really representative Victorians, except perhaps Tennyson, were

Radicals. But he seems to have thought of all reform as simple and

straightforward and all of a piece; as if Catholic Emancipation, the New

Poor Law, Free Trade and the Factory Acts and Popular Education were all

parts of one almost self-evident evolution of enlightenment. Dickens,

being in touch with the democracy, had already discovered that the

country had come to a dark place of divided ways and divided counsels.

In Hard Times he realised Democracy at war with Radicalism; and

became, with so incompatible an ally as Ruskin, not indeed a Socialist,

but certainly an anti-Individualist. In Our Mutual Friend he felt the

strength of the new rich, and knew they had begun to transform the

aristocracy, instead of the aristocracy transforming them. He knew that

Veneering had carried off Twemlow in triumph. He very nearly knew what

we all know to-day: that, so far from it being possible to plod along

the progressive road with more votes and more Free Trade, England must

either sharply become very much more democratic or as rapidly become

very much less so.

There gathers round these two great novelists a considerable group of

good novelists, who more or less mirror their mid-Victorian mood. Wilkie

Collins may be said to be in this way a lesser Dickens and Anthony

Trollope a lesser Thackeray. Wilkie Collins is chiefly typical of his

time in this respect: that while his moral and religious conceptions

were as mechanical as his carefully constructed fictitious conspiracies,

he nevertheless informed the latter with a sort of involuntary mysticism

which dealt wholly with the darker side of the soul. For this was one

of the most peculiar of the problems of the Victorian mind. The idea of

the supernatural was perhaps at as low an ebb as it had ever

been—certainly much lower than it is now. But in spite of this, and in

spite of a certain ethical cheeriness that was almost de rigueur—the

strange fact remains that the only sort of supernaturalism the

Victorians allowed to their imaginations was a sad supernaturalism. They

might have ghost stories, but not saints’ stories. They could trifle

with the curse or unpardoning prophecy of a witch, but not with the

pardon of a priest. They seem to have held (I believe erroneously) that

the supernatural was safest when it came from below. When we think (for

example) of the uncountable riches of religious art, imagery, ritual and

popular legend that has clustered round Christmas through all the

Christian ages, it is a truly extraordinary thing to reflect that

Dickens (wishing to have in The Christmas Carol a little happy

supernaturalism by way of a change) actually had to make up a mythology

for himself. Here was one of the rare cases where Dickens, in a real and

human sense, did suffer from the lack of culture. For the rest, Wilkie

Collins is these two elements: the mechanical and the mystical; both

very good of their kind. He is one of the few novelists in whose case it

is proper and literal to speak of his “plots.” He was a plotter; he went

about to slay Godfrey Ablewhite as coldly and craftily as the Indians

did. But he also had a sound though sinister note of true magic; as in

the repetition of the two white dresses in The Woman in White; or of

the dreams with their double explanations in Armadale. His ghosts do

walk. They are alive; and walk as softly as Count Fosco, but as solidly.

Finally, The Moonstone is probably the best detective tale in the

world.

Anthony Trollope, a clear and very capable realist, represents rather

another side of the Victorian spirit of comfort; its leisureliness, its

love of detail, especially of domestic detail; its love of following

characters and kindred from book to book and from generation to

generation. Dickens very seldom tried this latter experiment, and then

(as in Master Humphrey’s Clock) unsuccessfully; those magnesium blazes

of his were too brilliant and glaring to be indefinitely prolonged. But

Thackeray was full of it; and we often feel that the characters in _The

Newcomes_ or Philip might legitimately complain that their talk and

tale are being perpetually interrupted and pestered by people out of

other books. Within his narrower limits, Trollope was a more strict and

masterly realist than Thackeray, and even those who would call his

personages “types” would admit that they are as vivid as characters. It

was a bustling but a quiet world that he described: politics before the

coming of the Irish and the Socialists; the Church in the lull between

the Oxford Movement and the modern High Anglican energy. And it is

notable in the Victorian spirit once more that though his clergymen are

all of them real men and many of them good men, it never really occurs

to us to think of them as the priests of a religion.

Charles Reade may be said to go along with these; and Disraeli and even

Kingsley; not because these three very different persons had anything

particular in common, but because they all fell short of the first rank

in about the same degree. Charles Reade had a kind of cold coarseness

about him, not morally but artistically, which keeps him out of the best

literature as such: but he is of importance to the Victorian development

in another way; because he has the harsher and more tragic note that has

come later in the study of our social problems. He is the first of the

angry realists. Kingsley’s best books may be called boys’ books. There

is a real though a juvenile poetry in Westward Ho! and though that

narrative, historically considered, is very much of a lie, it is a good,

thundering honest lie. There are also genuinely eloquent things in

Hypatia, and a certain electric atmosphere of sectarian excitement

that Kingsley kept himself in, and did know how to convey. He said he

wrote the book in his heart’s blood. This is an exaggeration, but there

is a truth in it; and one does feel that he may have relieved his

feelings by writing it in red ink. As for Disraeli, his novels are able

and interesting considered as everything except novels, and are an

important contribution precisely because they are written by an alien

who did not take our politics so seriously as Trollope did. They are

important again as showing those later Victorian changes which men like

Thackeray missed. Disraeli did do something towards revealing the

dishonesty of our politics—even if he had done a good deal towards

bringing it about.

Between this group and the next there hovers a figure very hard to

place; not higher in letters than these, yet not easy to class with

them; I mean Bulwer Lytton. He was no greater than they were; yet

somehow he seems to take up more space. He did not, in the ultimate

reckoning, do anything in particular: but he was a figure; rather as

Oscar Wilde was later a figure. You could not have the Victorian Age

without him. And this was not due to wholly superficial things like his

dandyism, his dark, sinister good looks and a great deal of the mere

polished melodrama that he wrote. There was something in his all-round

interests; in the variety of things he tried; in his half-aristocratic

swagger as poet and politician, that made him in some ways a real

touchstone of the time. It is noticeable about him that he is always

turning up everywhere and that he brings other people out, generally in

a hostile spirit. His Byronic and almost Oriental ostentation was used

by the young Thackeray as something on which to sharpen his new razor of

Victorian common sense. His pose as a dilettante satirist inflamed the

execrable temper of Tennyson, and led to those lively comparisons to a

bandbox and a lion in curlpapers. He interposed the glove of warning and

the tear of sensibility between us and the proper ending of _Great

Expectations_. Of his own books, by far the best are the really charming

comedies about The Caxtons and Kenelm Chillingly; none of his other

works have a high literary importance now, with the possible exception

of A Strange Story; but his Coming Race is historically interesting

as foreshadowing those novels of the future which were afterwards such a

weapon of the Socialists. Lastly, there was an element indefinable about

Lytton, which often is in adventurers; which amounts to a suspicion that

there was something in him after all. It rang out of him when he said to

the hesitating Crimean Parliament: “Destroy your Government and save

your army.”

With the next phase of Victorian fiction we enter a new world; the

later, more revolutionary, more continental, freer but in some ways

weaker world in which we live to-day. The subtle and sad change that

was passing like twilight across the English brain at this time is very

well expressed in the fact that men have come to mention the great name

of Meredith in the same breath as Mr. Thomas Hardy. Both writers,

doubtless, disagreed with the orthodox religion of the ordinary English

village. Most of us have disagreed with that religion until we made the

simple discovery that it does not exist. But in any age where ideas

could be even feebly disentangled from each other, it would have been

evident at once that Meredith and Hardy were, intellectually speaking,

mortal enemies. They were much more opposed to each other than Newman

was to Kingsley; or than Abelard was to St. Bernard. But then they

collided in a sceptical age, which is like colliding in a London fog.

There can never be any clear controversy in a sceptical age.

Nevertheless both Hardy and Meredith did mean something; and they did

mean diametrically opposite things. Meredith was perhaps the only man

in the modern world who has almost had the high honour of rising out of

the low estate of a Pantheist into the high estate of a Pagan. A Pagan

is a person who can do what hardly any person for the last two thousand

years could do: a person who can take Nature naturally. It is due to

Meredith to say that no one outside a few of the great Greeks has ever

taken Nature so naturally as he did. And it is also due to him to say

that no one outside Colney Hatch ever took Nature so unnaturally as it

was taken in what Mr. Hardy has had the blasphemy to call Wessex Tales.

This division between the two points of view is vital; because the turn

of the nineteenth century was a very sharp one; by it we have reached

the rapids in which we find ourselves to-day.

Meredith really is a Pantheist. You can express it by saying that God is

the great All: you can express it much more intelligently by saying that

Pan is the great god. But there is some sense in it, and the sense is

this: that some people believe that this world is sufficiently good at

bottom for us to trust ourselves to it without very much knowing why. It

is the whole point in most of Meredith’s tales that there is something

behind us that often saves us when we understand neither it nor

ourselves. He sometimes talked mere intellectualism about women: but

that is because the most brilliant brains can get tired. Meredith’s

brain was quite tired when it wrote some of its most quoted and least

interesting epigrams: like that about passing Seraglio Point, but not

doubling Cape Turk. Those who can see Meredith’s mind in that are with

those who can see Dickens’ mind in Little Nell. Both were chivalrous

pronouncements on behalf of oppressed females: neither has any earthly

meaning as ideas.

But what Meredith did do for women was not to emancipate them (which

means nothing) but to express them, which means a great deal. And he

often expressed them right, even when he expressed himself wrong. Take,

for instance, that phrase so often quoted: “Woman will be the last thing

civilised by man.” Intellectually it is something worse than false; it

is the opposite of what he was always attempting to say. So far from

admitting any equality in the sexes, it logically admits that a man may

use against a woman any chains or whips he has been in the habit of

using against a tiger or a bear. He stood as the special champion of

female dignity: but I cannot remember any author, Eastern or Western,

who has so calmly assumed that man is the master and woman merely the

material, as Meredith really does in this phrase. Any one who knows a

free woman (she is generally a married woman) will immediately be

inclined to ask two simple and catastrophic questions, first: “Why

should woman be civilised?” and, second: “Why, if she is to be

civilised, should she be civilised by man?” In the mere intellectualism

of the matter, Meredith seems to be talking the most brutal sex

mastery: he, at any rate, has not doubled Cape Turk, nor even passed

Seraglio Point. Now why is it that we all really feel that this

Meredithian passage is not so insolently masculine as in mere logic it

would seem? I think it is for this simple reason: that there is

something about Meredith making us feel that it is not woman he

disbelieves in, but civilisation. It is a dark undemonstrated feeling

that Meredith would really be rather sorry if woman were civilised by

man—or by anything else. When we have got that, we have got the real

Pagan—the man that does believe in Pan.

It is proper to put this philosophic matter first, before the æsthetic

appreciation of Meredith, because with Meredith a sort of passing bell

has rung and the Victorian orthodoxy is certainly no longer safe.

Dickens and Carlyle, as we have said, rebelled against the orthodox

compromise: but Meredith has escaped from it. Cosmopolitanism,

Socialism, Feminism are already in the air; and Queen Victoria has

begun to look like Mrs. Grundy. But to escape from a city is one thing:

to choose a road is another. The free-thinker who found himself outside

the Victorian city, found himself also in the fork of two very different

naturalistic paths. One of them went upwards through a tangled but

living forest to lonely but healthy hills: the other went down to a

swamp. Hardy went down to botanise in the swamp, while Meredith climbed

towards the sun. Meredith became, at his best, a sort of daintily

dressed Walt Whitman: Hardy became a sort of village atheist brooding

and blaspheming over the village idiot. It is largely because the

free-thinkers, as a school, have hardly made up their minds whether they

want to be more optimist or more pessimist than Christianity that their

small but sincere movement has failed.

For the duel is deadly; and any agnostic who wishes to be anything more

than a Nihilist must sympathise with one version of nature or the

other. The God of Meredith is impersonal; but he is often more healthy

and kindly than any of the persons. That of Thomas Hardy is almost made

personal by the intense feeling that he is poisonous. Nature is always

coming in to save Meredith’s women; Nature is always coming in to betray

and ruin Hardy’s. It has been said that if God had not existed it would

have been necessary to invent Him. But it is not often, as in Mr.

Hardy’s case, that it is necessary to invent Him in order to prove how

unnecessary (and undesirable) He is. But Mr. Hardy is anthropomorphic

out of sheer atheism. He personifies the universe in order to give it a

piece of his mind. But the fight is unequal for the old philosophical

reason: that the universe had already given Mr. Hardy a piece of its

mind to fight with. One curious result of this divergence in the two

types of sceptic is this: that when these two brilliant novelists break

down or blow up or otherwise lose for a moment their artistic

self-command, they are both equally wild, but wild in opposite

directions. Meredith shows an extravagance in comedy which, if it were

not so complicated, every one would call broad farce. But Mr. Hardy has

the honour of inventing a new sort of game, which may be called the

extravagance of depression. The placing of the weak lover and his new

love in such a place that they actually see the black flag announcing

that Tess has been hanged is utterly inexcusable in art and probability;

it is a cruel practical joke. But it is a practical joke at which even

its author cannot brighten up enough to laugh.

But it is when we consider the great artistic power of these two

writers, with all their eccentricities, that we see even more clearly

that free-thought was, as it were, a fight between finger-posts. For it

is the remarkable fact that it was the man who had the healthy and manly

outlook who had the crabbed and perverse style; it was the man who had

the crabbed and perverse outlook who had the healthy and manly style.

The reader may well have complained of paradox when I observed above

that Meredith, unlike most neo-Pagans, did in his way take Nature

naturally. It may be suggested, in tones of some remonstrance, that

things like “though pierced by the cruel acerb,” or “thy fleetingness is

bigger in the ghost,” or “her gabbling grey she eyes askant,” or “sheer

film of the surface awag” are not taking Nature naturally. And this is

true of Meredith’s style, but it is not true of his spirit; nor even,

apparently, of his serious opinions. In one of the poems I have quoted

he actually says of those who live nearest to that Nature he was always

praising—

"Have they but held her laws and nature dear,

They mouth no sentence of inverted wit";

which certainly was what Meredith himself was doing most of the time.

But a similar paradox of the combination of plain tastes with twisted

phrases can also be seen in Browning. Something of the same can be seen

in many of the cavalier poets. I do not understand it: it may be that

the fertility of a cheerful mind crowds everything, so that the tree is

entangled in its own branches; or it may be that the cheerful mind cares

less whether it is understood or not; as a man is less articulate when

he is humming than when he is calling for help.

Certainly Meredith suffers from applying a complex method to men and

things he does not mean to be complex; nay, honestly admires for being

simple. The conversations between Diana and Redworth fail of their full

contrast because Meredith can afford the twopence for Diana coloured,

but cannot afford the penny for Redworth plain. Meredith’s ideals were

neither sceptical nor finicky: but they can be called insufficient. He

had, perhaps, over and above his honest Pantheism two convictions

profound enough to be called prejudices. He was probably of Welsh

blood, certainly of Celtic sympathies, and he set himself more swiftly

though more subtly than Ruskin or Swinburne to undermining the enormous

complacency of John Bull. He also had a sincere hope in the strength of

womanhood, and may be said, almost without hyperbole, to have begotten

gigantic daughters. He may yet suffer for his chivalric interference as

many champions do. I have little doubt that when St. George had killed

the dragon he was heartily afraid of the princess. But certainly neither

of these two vital enthusiasms touched the Victorian trouble. The

disaster of the modern English is not that they are not Celtic, but that

they are not English. The tragedy of the modern woman is not that she is

not allowed to follow man, but that she follows him far too slavishly.

This conscious and theorising Meredith did not get very near his problem

and is certainly miles away from ours. But the other Meredith was a

creator; which means a god. That is true of him which is true of so

different a man as Dickens, that all one can say of him is that he is

full of good things. A reader opening one of his books feels like a

schoolboy opening a hamper which he knows to have somehow cost a hundred

pounds. He may be more bewildered by it than by an ordinary hamper; but

he gets the impression of a real richness of thought; and that is what

one really gets from such riots of felicity as Evan Harrington or

Harry Richmond. His philosophy may be barren, but he was not. And the

chief feeling among those that enjoy him is a mere wish that more people

could enjoy him too.

I end here upon Hardy and Meredith; because this parting of the ways to

open optimism and open pessimism really was the end of the Victorian

peace. There are many other men, very nearly as great, on whom I might

delight to linger: on Shorthouse, for instance, who in one way goes with

Mrs. Browning or Coventry Patmore. I mean that he has a wide culture,

which is called by some a narrow religion. When we think what even the

best novels about cavaliers have been (written by men like Scott or

Stevenson) it is a wonderful thing that the author of John Inglesant

could write a cavalier romance in which he forgot Cromwell but

remembered Hobbes. But Shorthouse is outside the period in fiction in

the same sort of way in which Francis Thompson is outside it in poetry.

He did not accept the Victorian basis. He knew too much.

There is one more matter that may best be considered here, though

briefly: it illustrates the extreme difficulty of dealing with the

Victorian English in a book like this, because of their eccentricity;

not of opinions, but of character and artistic form. There are several

great Victorians who will not fit into any of the obvious categories I

employ; because they will not fit into anything, hardly into the world

itself. Where Germany or Italy would relieve the monotony of mankind by

paying serious respect to an artist, or a scholar, or a patriotic

warrior, or a priest—it was always the instinct of the English to do it

by pointing out a Character. Dr. Johnson has faded as a poet or a

critic, but he survives as a Character. Cobbett is neglected

(unfortunately) as a publicist and pamphleteer, but he is remembered as

a Character. Now these people continued to crop up through the Victorian

time; and each stands so much by himself that I shall end these pages

with a profound suspicion that I have forgotten to mention a Character

of gigantic dimensions. Perhaps the best example of such eccentrics is

George Borrow; who sympathised with unsuccessful nomads like the gipsies

while every one else sympathised with successful nomads like the Jews;

who had a genius like the west wind for the awakening of wild and casual

friendships and the drag and attraction of the roads. But whether George

Borrow ought to go into the section devoted to philosophers, or the

section devoted to novelists, or the section devoted to liars, nobody

else has ever known, even if he did.

But the strongest case of this Victorian power of being abruptly

original in a corner can be found in two things: the literature meant

merely for children and the literature meant merely for fun. It is true

that these two very Victorian things often melted into each other (as

was the way of Victorian things), but not sufficiently to make it safe

to mass them together without distinction. Thus there was George

Macdonald, a Scot of genius as genuine as Carlyle’s; he could write

fairy-tales that made all experience a fairy-tale. He could give the

real sense that every one had the end of an elfin thread that must at

last lead them into Paradise. It was a sort of optimist Calvinism. But

such really significant fairy-tales were accidents of genius. Of the

Victorian Age as a whole it is true to say that it did discover a new

thing; a thing called Nonsense. It may be doubted whether this thing was

really invented to please children. Rather it was invented by old

people trying to prove their first childhood, and sometimes succeeding

only in proving their second. But whatever else the thing was, it was

English and it was individual. Lewis Carroll gave mathematics a holiday:

he carried logic into the wild lands of illogicality. Edward Lear, a

richer, more romantic and therefore more truly Victorian buffoon,

improved the experiment. But the more we study it, the more we shall, I

think, conclude that it reposed on something more real and profound in

the Victorians than even their just and exquisite appreciation of

children. It came from the deep Victorian sense of humour.

It may appear, because I have used from time to time the only possible

phrases for the case, that I mean the Victorian Englishman to appear as

a blockhead, which means an unconscious buffoon. To all this there is a

final answer: that he was also a conscious buffoon—and a successful

one. He was a humorist; and one of the best humorists in Europe. That

which Goethe had never taught the Germans, Byron did manage to teach the

English—the duty of not taking him seriously. The strong and shrewd

Victorian humour appears in every slash of the pencil of Charles Keene;

in every undergraduate inspiration of Calverley or “Q.” or J. K. S. They

had largely forgotten both art and arms: but the gods had left them

laughter.

But the final proof that the Victorians were alive by this laughter, can

be found in the fact they could manage and master for a moment even the

cosmopolitan modern theatre. They could contrive to put “The Bab

Ballads” on the stage. To turn a private name into a public epithet is a

thing given to few: but the word “Gilbertian” will probably last longer

than the name Gilbert.

It meant a real Victorian talent; that of exploding unexpectedly and

almost, as it seemed, unintentionally. Gilbert made good jokes by the

thousand; but he never (in his best days) made the joke that could

possibly have been expected of him. This is the last essential of the

Victorian. Laugh at him as a limited man, a moralist, conventionalist,

an opportunist, a formalist. But remember also that he was really a

humorist; and may still be laughing at you.

CHAPTER III

THE GREAT VICTORIAN POETS

What was really unsatisfactory in Victorian literature is something much

easier to feel than to state. It was not so much a superiority in the

men of other ages to the Victorian men. It was a superiority of

Victorian men to themselves. The individual was unequal. Perhaps that is

why the society became unequal: I cannot say. They were lame giants; the

strongest of them walked on one leg a little shorter than the other. A

great man in any age must be a common man, and also an uncommon man.

Those that are only uncommon men are perverts and sowers of pestilence.

But somehow the great Victorian man was more and less than this. He was

at once a giant and a dwarf. When he has been sweeping the sky in

circles infinitely great, he suddenly shrivels into something

indescribably small. There is a moment when Carlyle turns suddenly from

a high creative mystic to a common Calvinist. There are moments when

George Eliot turns from a prophetess into a governess. There are also

moments when Ruskin turns into a governess, without even the excuse of

sex. But in all these cases the alteration comes as a thing quite abrupt

and unreasonable. We do not feel this acute angle anywhere in Homer or

in Virgil or in Chaucer or in Shakespeare or in Dryden; such things as

they knew they knew. It is no disgrace to Homer that he had not

discovered Britain; or to Virgil that he had not discovered America; or

to Chaucer that he had not discovered the solar system; or to Dryden

that he had not discovered the steam-engine. But we do most frequently

feel, with the Victorians, that the very vastness of the number of

things they know illustrates the abrupt abyss of the things they do not

know. We feel, in a sort of way, that it is a disgrace to a man like

Carlyle when he asks the Irish why they do not bestir themselves and

re-forest their country: saying not a word about the soaking up of every

sort of profit by the landlords which made that and every other Irish

improvement impossible. We feel that it is a disgrace to a man like

Ruskin when he says, with a solemn visage, that building in iron is ugly

and unreal, but that the weightiest objection is that there is no

mention of it in the Bible; we feel as if he had just said he could find

no hair-brushes in Habakkuk. We feel that it is a disgrace to a man

like Thackeray when he proposes that people should be forcibly prevented

from being nuns, merely because he has no fixed intention of becoming a

nun himself. We feel that it is a disgrace to a man like Tennyson,

when he talks of the French revolutions, the huge crusades that had

recreated the whole of his civilisation, as being “no graver than a

schoolboy’s barring out.” We feel that it is a disgrace to a man like

Browning to make spluttering and spiteful puns about the names Newman,

Wiseman, and Manning. We feel that it is a disgrace to a man like

Newman when he confesses that for some time he felt as if he couldn’t

come in to the Catholic Church, because of that dreadful Mr. Daniel

O’Connell, who had the vulgarity to fight for his own country. We feel

that it is a disgrace to a man like Dickens, when he makes a blind

brute and savage out of a man like St. Dunstan; it sounds as if it were

not Dickens talking but Dombey. We feel it is a disgrace to a man like

Swinburne, when he has a Jingo fit and calls the Boer children in the

concentration camps “Whelps of treacherous dams whom none save we have

spared to starve and slay”: we feel that Swinburne, for the first time,

really has become an immoral and indecent writer. All this is a certain

odd provincialism peculiar to the English in that great century: they

were in a kind of pocket; they appealed to too narrow a public opinion;

I am certain that no French or German men of the same genius made such

remarks. Renan was the enemy of the Catholic Church; but who can imagine

Renan writing of it as Kingsley or Dickens did? Taine was the enemy of

the French Revolution; but who can imagine Taine talking about it as

Tennyson or Newman talked? Even Matthew Arnold, though he saw this peril

and prided himself on escaping it, did not altogether escape it. There

must be (to use an Irishism) something shallow in the depths of any man

who talks about the Zeitgeist as if it were a living thing.

But this defect is very specially the key to the case of the two great

Victorian poets, Tennyson and Browning; the two spirited or beautiful

tunes, so to speak, to which the other events marched or danced. It was

especially so of Tennyson, for a reason which raises some of the most

real problems about his poetry. Tennyson, of course, owed a great deal

to Virgil. There is no question of plagiarism here; a debt to Virgil is

like a debt to Nature. But Tennyson was a provincial Virgil. In such

passages as that about the schoolboy’s barring out he might be called a

suburban Virgil. I mean that he tried to have the universal balance of

all the ideas at which the great Roman had aimed: but he hadn’t got hold

of all the ideas to balance. Hence his work was not a balance of truths,

like the universe. It was a balance of whims; like the British

Constitution. It is intensely typical of Tennyson’s philosophical temper

that he was almost the only Poet Laureate who was not ludicrous. It is

not absurd to think of Tennyson as tuning his harp in praise of Queen

Victoria: that is, it is not absurd in the same sense as Chaucer’s harp

hallowed by dedication to Richard II or Wordsworth’s harp hallowed by

dedication to George IV is absurd. Richard’s court could not properly

appreciate either Chaucer’s daisies or his “devotion.” George IV would

not have gone pottering about Helvellyn in search of purity and the

simple annals of the poor. But Tennyson did sincerely believe in the

Victorian compromise; and sincerity is never undignified. He really did

hold a great many of the same views as Queen Victoria, though he was

gifted with a more fortunate literary style. If Dickens is Cobbett’s

democracy stirring in its grave, Tennyson is the exquisitely ornamental

extinguisher on the flame of the first revolutionary poets. England has

settled down; England has become Victorian. The compromise was

interesting, it was national and for a long time it was successful:

there is still a great deal to be said for it. But it was as freakish

and unphilosophic, as arbitrary and untranslatable, as a beggar’s

patched coat or a child’s secret language. Now it is here that Browning

had a certain odd advantage over Tennyson; which has, perhaps, somewhat

exaggerated his intellectual superiority to him. Browning’s eccentric

style was more suitable to the poetry of a nation of eccentrics; of

people for the time being removed far from the centre of intellectual

interests. The hearty and pleasant task of expressing one’s intense

dislike of something one doesn’t understand is much more poetically

achieved by saying, in a general way “Grrr—you swine!” than it is by

laboured lines such as “the red fool-fury of the Seine.” We all feel

that there is more of the man in Browning here; more of Dr. Johnson or

Cobbett. Browning is the Englishman taking himself wilfully, following

his nose like a bull-dog, going by his own likes and dislikes. We cannot

help feeling that Tennyson is the Englishman taking himself

seriously—an awful sight. One’s memory flutters unhappily over a

certain letter about the Papal Guards written by Sir Willoughby

Patterne. It is here chiefly that Tennyson suffers by that very

Virgilian loveliness and dignity of diction which he put to the service

of such a small and anomalous national scheme. Virgil had the best news

to tell as well as the best words to tell it in. His world might be

sad; but it was the largest world one could live in before the coming of

Christianity. If he told the Romans to spare the vanquished and to war

down the mighty, at least he was more or less well informed about who

were mighty and who were vanquished. But when Tennyson wrote verses

like—

"Of freedom in her regal seat,

Of England; not the schoolboy heat,

The blind hysterics of the Celt"

he quite literally did not know one word of what he was talking about;

he did not know what Celts are, or what hysterics are, or what freedom

was, or what regal was or even of what England was—in the living Europe

of that time.

His religious range was very much wider and wiser than his political;

but here also he suffered from treating as true universality a thing

that was only a sort of lukewarm local patriotism. Here also he

suffered by the very splendour and perfection of his poetical powers. He

was quite the opposite of the man who cannot express himself; the

inarticulate singer who dies with all his music in him. He had a great

deal to say; but he had much more power of expression than was wanted

for anything he had to express. He could not think up to the height of

his own towering style.

For whatever else Tennyson was, he was a great poet; no mind that feels

itself free, that is, above the ebb and flow of fashion, can feel

anything but contempt for the later effort to discredit him in that

respect. It is true that, like Browning and almost every other Victorian

poet, he was really two poets. But it is just to him to insist that in

his case (unlike Browning’s) both the poets were good. The first is more

or less like Stevenson in metre; it is a magical luck or skill in the

mere choice of words. “Wet sands marbled with moon and cloud”—“Flits by

the sea-blue bird of March”—“Leafless ribs and iron horns”—“When the

long dun wolds are ribbed with snow”—in all these cases one word is the

keystone of an arch which would fall into ruin without it. But there are

other strong phrases that recall not Stevenson but rather their common

master, Virgil—“Tears from the depths of some divine despair”—“There

is fallen a splendid tear from the passion-flower at the gate”—“Was a

great water; and the moon was full”—“God made Himself an awful rose of

dawn.” These do not depend on a word but on an idea: they might even be

translated. It is also true, I think, that he was first and last a lyric

poet. He was always best when he expressed himself shortly. In long

poems he had an unfortunate habit of eventually saying very nearly the

opposite of what he meant to say. I will take only two instances of what

I mean. In the Idylls of the King, and in In Memoriam (his two

sustained and ambitious efforts), particular phrases are always flashing

out the whole fire of the truth; the truth that Tennyson meant. But

owing to his English indolence, his English aristocratic

irresponsibility, his English vagueness in thought, he always managed to

make the main poem mean exactly what he did not mean. Thus, these two

lines which simply say that

"Lancelot was the first in tournament,

But Arthur mightiest in the battle-field"

do really express what he meant to express about Arthur being after all

“the highest, yet most human too; not Lancelot, nor another.” But as his

hero is actually developed, we have exactly the opposite impression;

that poor old Lancelot, with all his faults, was much more of a man than

Arthur. He was a Victorian in the bad as well as the good sense; he

could not keep priggishness out of long poems. Or again, take the case

of In Memoriam. I will quote one verse (probably incorrectly) which

has always seemed to me splendid, and which does express what the whole

poem should express—but hardly does.

"That we may lift from out the dust,

A voice as unto him that hears

A cry above the conquered years

Of one that ever works, and trust."

The poem should have been a cry above the conquered years. It might well

have been that if the poet could have said sharply at the end of it, as

a pure piece of dogma, “I’ve forgotten every feature of the man’s face:

I know God holds him alive.” But under the influence of the mere

leisurely length of the thing, the reader does rather receive the

impression that the wound has been healed only by time; and that the

victor hours can boast that this is the man that loved and lost, but

all he was is overworn. This is not the truth; and Tennyson did not

intend it for the truth. It is simply the result of the lack of

something militant, dogmatic and structural in him: whereby he could not

be trusted with the trail of a very long literary process without

entangling himself like a kitten playing cat’s-cradle.

Browning, as above suggested, got on much better with eccentric and

secluded England because he treated it as eccentric and secluded; a

place where one could do what one liked. To a considerable extent he did

do what he liked; arousing not a few complaints; and many doubts and

conjectures as to why on earth he liked it. Many comparatively

sympathetic persons pondered upon what pleasure it could give any man to

write Sordello or rhyme “end-knot” to “offend not.” Nevertheless he

was no anarchist and no mystagogue; and even where he was defective, his

defect has commonly been stated wrongly. The two chief charges against

him were a contempt for form unworthy of an artist, and a poor pride in

obscurity. The obscurity is true, though not, I think, the pride in it;

but the truth about this charge rather rises out of the truth about the

other. The other charge is not true. Browning cared very much for form;

he cared very much for style. You may not happen to like his style; but

he did. To say that he had not enough mastery over form to express

himself perfectly like Tennyson or Swinburne is like criticising the

griffin of a mediæval gargoyle without even knowing that it is a

griffin; treating it as an infantile and unsuccessful attempt at a

classical angel. A poet indifferent to form ought to mean a poet who did

not care what form he used as long as he expressed his thoughts. He

might be a rather entertaining sort of poet; telling a smoking-room

story in blank verse or writing a hunting-song in the Spenserian stanza;

giving a realistic analysis of infanticide in a series of triolets; or

proving the truth of Immortality in a long string of limericks. Browning

certainly had no such indifference. Almost every poem of Browning,

especially the shortest and most successful ones, was moulded or graven

in some special style, generally grotesque, but invariably deliberate.

In most cases whenever he wrote a new song he wrote a new kind of song.

The new lyric is not only of a different metre, but of a different

shape. No one, not even Browning, ever wrote a poem in the same style as

that horrible one beginning “John, Master of the Temple of God,” with

its weird choruses and creepy prose directions. No one, not even

Browning, ever wrote a poem in the same style as Pisgah-sights. No

one, not even Browning, ever wrote a poem in the same style as _Time’s

Revenges_. No one, not even Browning, ever wrote a poem in the same

style as Meeting at Night and Parting at Morning. No one, not even

Browning, ever wrote a poem in the same style as _The Flight of the

Duchess_, or in the same style as The Grammarian’s Funeral, or in the

same style as A Star, or in the same style as that astounding lyric

which begins abruptly “Some people hang pictures up.” These metres and

manners were not accidental; they really do suit the sort of spiritual

experiment Browning was making in each case. Browning, then, was not

chaotic; he was deliberately grotesque. But there certainly was, over

and above this grotesqueness, a perversity and irrationality about the

man which led him to play the fool in the middle of his own poems; to

leave off carving gargoyles and simply begin throwing stones. His

curious complicated puns are an example of this: Hood had used the pun

to make a sentence or a sentiment especially pointed and clear. In

Browning the word with two meanings seems to mean rather less, if

anything, than the word with one. It also applies to his trick of

setting himself to cope with impossible rhymes. It may be fun, though it

is not poetry, to try rhyming to ranunculus; but even the fun

presupposes that you do rhyme to it; and I will affirm, and hold under

persecution, that “Tommy-make-room-for-your-uncle-us” does not rhyme to

it.

The obscurity, to which he must in a large degree plead guilty, was,

curiously enough, the result rather of the gay artist in him than the

deep thinker. It is patience in the Browning students; in Browning it

was only impatience. He wanted to say something comic and energetic and

he wanted to say it quick. And, between his artistic skill in the

fantastic and his temperamental turn for the abrupt, the idea sometimes

flashed past unseen. But it is quite an error to suppose that these are

the dark mines containing his treasure. The two or three great and true

things he really had to say he generally managed to say quite simply.

Thus he really did want to say that God had indeed made man and woman

one flesh; that the sex relation was religious in this real sense that

even in our sin and despair we take it for granted and expect a sort of

virtue in it. The feelings of the bad husband about the good wife, for

instance, are about as subtle and entangled as any matter on this earth;

and Browning really had something to say about them. But he said it in

some of the plainest and most unmistakable words in all literature; as

lucid as a flash of lightning. “Pompilia, will you let them murder me?”

Or again, he did really want to say that death and such moral terrors

were best taken in a military spirit; he could not have said it more

simply than: “I was ever a fighter; one fight more, the best and the

last.” He did really wish to say that human life was unworkable unless

immortality were implied in it every other moment; he could not have

said it more simply: “leave now to dogs and apes; Man has for ever.” The

obscurities were not merely superficial, but often covered quite

superficial ideas. He was as likely as not to be most unintelligible of

all in writing a compliment in a lady’s album. I remember in my boyhood

(when Browning kept us awake like coffee) a friend reading out the poem

about the portrait to which I have already referred, reading it in that

rapid dramatic way in which this poet must be read. And I was profoundly

puzzled at the passage where it seemed to say that the cousin

disparaged the picture, “while John scorns ale.” I could not think what

this sudden teetotalism on the part of John had to do with the affair,

but I forgot to ask at the time and it was only years afterwards that,

looking at the book, I found it was “John’s corns ail,” a very

Browningesque way of saying he winced. Most of Browning’s obscurity is

of that sort—the mistakes are almost as quaint as misprints—and the

Browning student, in that sense, is more a proof reader than a disciple.

For the rest his real religion was of the most manly, even the most

boyish sort. He is called an optimist; but the word suggests a

calculated contentment which was not in the least one of his vices. What

he really was was a romantic. He offered the cosmos as an adventure

rather than a scheme. He did not explain evil, far less explain it away;

he enjoyed defying it. He was a troubadour even in theology and

metaphysics: like the Jongleurs de Dieu of St. Francis. He may be said

to have serenaded heaven with a guitar, and even, so to speak, tried to

climb there with a rope ladder. Thus his most vivid things are the

red-hot little love lyrics, or rather, little love dramas. He did one

really original and admirable thing: he managed the real details of

modern love affairs in verse, and love is the most realistic thing in

the world. He substituted the street with the green blind for the faded

garden of Watteau, and the “blue spirt of a lighted match” for the

monotony of the evening star.

Before leaving him it should be added that he was fitted to deepen the

Victorian mind, but not to broaden it. With all his Italian sympathies

and Italian residence, he was not the man to get Victorian England out

of its provincial rut: on many things Kingsley himself was not so

narrow. His celebrated wife was wider and wiser than he in this sense;

for she was, however one-sidedly, involved in the emotions of central

European politics. She defended Louis Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel; and

intelligently, as one conscious of the case against them both. As to

why it now seems simple to defend the first Italian King, but absurd to

defend the last French Emperor—well, the reason is sad and simple. It

is concerned with certain curious things called success and failure, and

I ought to have considered it under the heading of The Book of Snobs.

But Elizabeth Barrett, at least, was no snob: her political poems have

rather an impatient air, as if they were written, and even published,

rather prematurely—just before the fall of her idol. These old

political poems of hers are too little read to-day; they are amongst the

most sincere documents on the history of the times, and many modern

blunders could be corrected by the reading of them. And Elizabeth

Barrett had a strength really rare among women poets; the strength of

the phrase. She excelled in her sex, in epigram, almost as much as

Voltaire in his. Pointed phrases like: “Martyrs by the pang without the

palm”—or “Incense to sweeten a crime and myrrh to embitter a curse,”

these expressions, which are witty after the old fashion of the conceit,

came quite freshly and spontaneously to her quite modern mind. But the

first fact is this, that these epigrams of hers were never so true as

when they turned on one of the two or three pivots on which contemporary

Europe was really turning. She is by far the most European of all the

English poets of that age; all of them, even her own much greater

husband, look local beside her. Tennyson and the rest are nowhere. Take

any positive political fact, such as the final fall of Napoleon.

Tennyson wrote these profoundly foolish lines—

"He thought to quell the stubborn hearts of oak

Madman!"

as if the defeat of an English regiment were a violation of the laws of

Nature. Mrs. Browning knew no more facts about Napoleon, perhaps, than

Tennyson did; but she knew the truth. Her epigram on Napoleon’s fall is

in one line

"And kings crept out again to feel the sun."

Talleyrand would have clapped his horrible old hands at that. Her

instinct about the statesman and the soldier was very like Jane Austen’s

instinct for the gentleman and the man. It is not unnoticeable that as

Miss Austen spent most of her life in a village, Miss Barrett spent most

of her life on a sofa. The godlike power of guessing seems (for some

reason I do not understand) to grow under such conditions. Unfortunately

Mrs. Browning was like all the other Victorians in going a little lame,

as I have roughly called it, having one leg shorter than the other. But

her case was, in one sense, extreme. She exaggerated both ways. She was

too strong and too weak, or (as a false sex philosophy would express it)

too masculine and too feminine. I mean that she hit the centre of

weakness with almost the same emphatic precision with which she hit the

centre of strength. She could write finally of the factory wheels

“grinding life down from its mark,” a strong and strictly true

observation. Unfortunately she could also write of Euripides “with his

droppings of warm tears.” She could write in A Drama of Exile, a

really fine exposition, touching the later relation of Adam and the

animals: unfortunately the tears were again turned on at the wrong

moment at the main; and the stage direction commands a silence, only

broken by the dropping of angel’s tears. How much noise is made by

angel’s tears? Is it a sound of emptied buckets, or of garden hose, or

of mountain cataracts? That is the sort of question which Elizabeth

Barrett’s extreme love of the extreme was always tempting people to ask.

Yet the question, as asked, does her a heavy historical injustice; we

remember all the lines in her work which were weak enough to be called

“womanly,” we forget the multitude of strong lines that are strong

enough to be called “manly”; lines that Kingsley or Henley would have

jumped for joy to print in proof of their manliness. She had one of the

peculiar talents of true rhetoric, that of a powerful concentration. As

to the critic who thinks her poetry owed anything to the great poet who

was her husband, he can go and live in the same hotel with the man who

can believe that George Eliot owed anything to the extravagant

imagination of Mr. George Henry Lewes. So far from Browning inspiring or

interfering, he did not in one sense interfere enough. Her real

inferiority to him in literature is that he was consciously while she

was unconsciously absurd.

It is natural, in the matter of Victorian moral change, to take

Swinburne as the next name here. He is the only poet who was also, in

the European sense, on the spot; even if, in the sense of the Gilbertian

song, the spot was barred. He also knew that something rather crucial

was happening to Christendom; he thought it was getting unchristened. It

is even a little amusing, indeed, that these two Pro-Italian poets

almost conducted a political correspondence in rhyme. Mrs. Browning

sternly reproached those who had ever doubted the good faith of the King

of Sardinia, whom she acclaimed as being truly a king. Swinburne,

lyrically alluding to her as “Sea-eagle of English feather,” broadly

hinted that the chief blunder of that wild fowl had been her support of

an autocratic adventurer: “calling a crowned man royal, that was no more

than a king.” But it is not fair, even in this important connection, to

judge Swinburne by Songs Before Sunrise. They were songs before a

sunrise that has never turned up. Their dogmatic assertions have for a

long time past stared starkly at us as nonsense. As, for instance, the

phrase “Glory to Man in the Highest, for man is the master of things”;

after which there is evidently nothing to be said, except that it is

not true. But even where Swinburne had his greater grip, as in that

grave and partly just poem Before a Crucifix, Swinburne, the most

Latin, the most learned, the most largely travelled of the Victorians,

still knows far less of the facts than even Mrs. Browning. The whole of

the poem, Before a Crucifix, breaks down by one mere mistake. It

imagines that the French or Italian peasants who fell on their knees

before the Crucifix did so because they were slaves. They fell on their

knees because they were free men, probably owning their own farms.

Swinburne could have found round about Putney plenty of slaves who had

no crucifixes: but only crucifixions.

When we come to ethics and philosophy, doubtless we find Swinburne in

full revolt, not only against the temperate idealism of Tennyson, but

against the genuine piety and moral enthusiasm of people like Mrs.

Browning. But here again Swinburne is very English, nay, he is very

Victorian, for his revolt is illogical. For the purposes of intelligent

insurrection against priests and kings, Swinburne ought to have

described the natural life of man, free and beautiful, and proved from

this both the noxiousness and the needlessness of such chains.

Unfortunately Swinburne rebelled against Nature first and then tried to

rebel against religion for doing exactly the same thing that he had

done. His songs of joy are not really immoral; but his songs of sorrow

are. But when he merely hurls at the priest the assertion that flesh is

grass and life is sorrow, he really lays himself open to the restrained

answer, “So I have ventured, on various occasions, to remark.” When he

went forth, as it were, as the champion of pagan change and pleasure, he

heard uplifted the grand choruses of his own Atalanta, in his rear,

refusing hope.

The splendid diction that blazes through the whole of that drama, that

still dances exquisitely in the more lyrical Poems and Ballads, makes

some marvellous appearances in Songs Before Sunrise, and then mainly

falters and fades away, is, of course, the chief thing about Swinburne.

The style is the man; and some will add that it does not, thus

unsupported, amount to much of a man. But the style itself suffers some

injustice from those who would speak thus. The views expressed are often

quite foolish and often quite insincere; but the style itself is a

manlier and more natural thing than is commonly made out. It is not in

the least languorous or luxurious or merely musical and sensuous, as one

would gather from both the eulogies and the satires, from the conscious

and the unconscious imitations. On the contrary, it is a sort of

fighting and profane parody of the Old Testament; and its lines are made

of short English words like the short Roman swords. The first line of

one of his finest poems, for instance, runs, “I have lived long enough

to have seen one thing, that love hath an end.” In that sentence only

one small “e” gets outside the monosyllable. Through all his

interminable tragedies, he was fondest of lines like—

"If ever I leave off to honour you

God give me shame; I were the worst churl born."

The dramas were far from being short and dramatic; but the words really

were. Nor was his verse merely smooth; except his very bad verse, like

“the lilies and languors of virtue, to the raptures and roses of vice,”

which both, in cheapness of form and foolishness of sentiment, may be

called the worst couplet in the world’s literature. In his real poetry

(even in the same poem) his rhythm and rhyme are as original and

ambitious as Browning; and the only difference between him and Browning

is, not that he is smooth and without ridges, but that he always crests

the ridge triumphantly and Browning often does not—

"On thy bosom though many a kiss be,

There are none such as knew it of old.

Was it Alciphron once or Arisbe,

Male ringlets or feminine gold,

That thy lips met with under the statue

Whence a look shot out sharp after thieves

From the eyes of the garden-god at you

Across the fig-leaves."

Look at the rhymes in that verse, and you will see they are as stiff a

task as Browning’s: only they are successful. That is the real strength

of Swinburne—a style. It was a style that nobody could really imitate;

and least of all Swinburne himself, though he made the attempt all

through his later years. He was, if ever there was one, an inspired

poet. I do not think it the highest sort of poet. And you never discover

who is an inspired poet until the inspiration goes.

With Swinburne we step into the circle of that later Victorian influence

which was very vaguely called Æsthetic. Like all human things, but

especially Victorian things, it was not only complex but confused.

Things in it that were at one on the emotional side were flatly at war

on the intellectual. In the section of the painters, it was the allies

or pupils of Ruskin, pious, almost painfully exact, and copying mediæval

details rather for their truth than their beauty. In the section of the

poets it was pretty loose, Swinburne being the leader of the revels. But

there was one great man who was in both sections, a painter and a poet,

who may be said to bestride the chasm like a giant. It is in an odd and

literal sense true that the name of Rossetti is important here, for the

name implies the nationality. I have loosely called Carlyle and the

Brontës the romance from the North; the nearest to a general definition

of the Æsthetic movement is to call it the romance from the South. It is

that warm wind that had never blown so strong since Chaucer, standing in

his cold English April, had smelt the spring in Provence. The Englishman

has always found it easier to get inspiration from the Italians than

from the French; they call to each other across that unconquered castle

of reason. Browning’s Englishman in Italy, Browning’s _Italian in

England_, were both happier than either would have been in France.

Rossetti was the Italian in England, as Browning was the Englishman in

Italy; and the first broad fact about the artistic revolution Rossetti

wrought is written when we have written his name. But if the South lets

in warmth or heat, it also lets in hardness. The more the orange tree is

luxuriant in growth, the less it is loose in outline. And it is exactly

where the sea is slightly warmer than marble that it looks slightly

harder. This, I think, is the one universal power behind the Æsthetic

and Pre-Raphaelite movements, which all agreed in two things at least:

strictness in the line and strength, nay violence, in the colour.

Rossetti was a remarkable man in more ways than one; he did not succeed

in any art; if he had he would probably never have been heard of. It was

his happy knack of half failing in both the arts that has made him a

success. If he had been as good a poet as Tennyson, he would have been a

poet who painted pictures. If he had been as good a painter as

Burne-Jones, he would have been a painter who wrote poems. It is odd to

note on the very threshold of the extreme art movement that this great

artist largely succeeded by not defining his art. His poems were too

pictorial. His pictures were too poetical. That is why they really

conquered the cold satisfaction of the Victorians, because they did mean

something, even if it was a small artistic thing.

Rossetti was one with Ruskin, on the one hand, and Swinburne on the

other, in reviving the decorative instinct of the Middle Ages. While

Ruskin, in letters only, praised that decoration Rossetti and his

friends repeated it. They almost made patterns of their poems. That

frequent return of the refrain which was foolishly discussed by

Professor Nordau was, in Rossetti’s case, of such sadness as sometimes

to amount to sameness. The criticism on him, from a mediæval point of

view, is not that he insisted on a chorus, but that he could not insist

on a jolly chorus. Many of his poems were truly mediæval, but they would

have been even more mediæval if he could ever have written such a

refrain as “Tally Ho!” or even “Tooral-ooral” instead of “Tall Troy’s on

fire.” With Rossetti goes, of course, his sister, a real poet, though

she also illustrated that Pre-Raphaelite’s conflict of views that

covered their coincidence of taste. Both used the angular outlines, the

burning transparencies, the fixed but still unfathomable symbols of the

great mediæval civilisation; but Rossetti used the religious imagery (on

the whole) irreligiously, Christina Rossetti used it religiously but (on

the whole) so to make it seem a narrower religion.

One poet, or, to speak more strictly, one poem, belongs to the same

general atmosphere and impulse as Swinburne; the free but languid

atmosphere of later Victorian art. But this time the wind blew from

hotter and heavier gardens than the gardens of Italy. Edward

Fitzgerald, a cultured eccentric, a friend of Tennyson, produced what

professed to be a translation of the Persian poet Omar, who wrote

quatrains about wine and roses and things in general. Whether the

Persian original, in its own Persian way, was greater or less than this

version I must not discuss here, and could not discuss anywhere. But it

is quite clear that Fitzgerald’s work is much too good to be a good

translation. It is as personal and creative a thing as ever was written;

and the best expression of a bad mood, a mood that may, for all I know,

be permanent in Persia, but was certainly at this time particularly

fashionable in England. In the technical sense of literature it is one

of the most remarkable achievements of that age; as poetical as

Swinburne and far more perfect. In this verbal sense its most arresting

quality is a combination of something haunting and harmonious that flows

by like a river or a song, with something else that is compact and

pregnant like a pithy saying picked out in rock by the chisel of some

pagan philosopher. It is at once a tune that escapes and an inscription

that remains. Thus, alone among the reckless and romantic verses that

first rose in Coleridge or Keats, it preserves something also of the wit

and civilisation of the eighteenth century. Lines like “a Muezzin from

the tower of darkness cries,” or “Their mouths are stopped with dust”

are successful in the same sense as “Pinnacled dim in the intense inane”

or “Through verdurous glooms and winding mossy ways.” But—

"Indeed, indeed, repentance oft before

I swore; but was I sober when I swore?"

is equally successful in the same sense as—

"Damn with faint praise, assent with civil leer

And without sneering teach the rest to sneer."

It thus earned a right to be considered the complete expression of that

scepticism and sensual sadness into which later Victorian literature was

more and more falling away: a sort of bible of unbelief. For a cold fit

had followed the hot fit of Swinburne, which was of a feverish sort: he

had set out to break down without having, or even thinking he had, the

rudiments of rebuilding in him; and he effected nothing national even in

the way of destruction. The Tennysonians still walked past him as primly

as a young ladies’ school—the Browningites still inked their eyebrows

and minds in looking for the lost syntax of Browning; while Browning

himself was away looking for God, rather in the spirit of a truant boy

from their school looking for birds’ nests. The nineteenth-century

sceptics did not really shake the respectable world and alter it, as the

eighteenth-century sceptics had done; but that was because the

eighteenth-century sceptics were something more than sceptics, and

believed in Greek tragedies, in Roman laws, in the Republic. The

Swinburnian sceptics had nothing to fight for but a frame of mind; and

when ordinary English people listened to it, they came to the conclusion

that it was a frame of mind they would rather hear about than

experience. But these later poets did, so to speak, spread their soul in

all the empty spaces; weaker brethren, disappointed artists, unattached

individuals, very young people, were sapped or swept away by these

songs; which, so far as any particular sense in them goes, were almost

songs without words. It is because there is something which is after all

indescribably manly, intellectual, firm about Fitzgerald’s way of

phrasing the pessimism that he towers above the slope that was tumbling

down to the decadents. But it is still pessimism, a thing unfit for a

white man; a thing like opium, that may often be a poison and sometimes

a medicine, but never a food for us, who are driven by an inner command

not only to think but to live, not only to live but to grow, and not

only to grow but to build.

And, indeed, we see the insufficiency of such sad extremes even in the

next name among the major poets; we see the Swinburnian parody of

mediævalism, the inverted Catholicism of the decadents, struggling to

get back somehow on its feet. The æsthetic school had, not quite

unjustly, the name of mere dilettanti. But it is fair to say that in the

next of them, a workman and a tradesman, we already feel something of

that return to real issues leading up to the real revolts that broke up

Victorianism at last. In the mere art of words, indeed, William Morris

carried much further than Swinburne or Rossetti the mere imitation of

stiff mediæval ornament. The other mediævalists had their modern

moments; which were (if they had only known it) much more mediæval than

their mediæval moments. Swinburne could write—

"We shall see Buonaparte the bastard

Kick heels with his throat in a rope."

One has an uneasy feeling that William Morris would have written

something like—

"And the kin of the ill king Bonaparte

Hath a high gallows for all his part."

Rossetti could, for once in a way, write poetry about a real woman and

call her “Jenny.” One has a disturbed suspicion that Morris would have

called her “Jehanne.”

But all that seems at first more archaic and decorative about Morris

really arose from the fact that he was more virile and real than either

Swinburne or Rossetti. It arose from the fact that he really was, what

he so often called himself, a craftsman. He had enough masculine

strength to be tidy: that is, after the masculine manner, tidy about his

own trade. If his poems were too like wallpapers, it was because he

really could make wallpapers. He knew that lines of poetry ought to be

in a row, as palings ought to be in a row; and he knew that neither

palings nor poetry looks any the worse for being simple or even severe.

In a sense Morris was all the more creative because he felt the hard

limits of creation as he would have felt them if he were not working in

words but in wood; and if he was unduly dominated by the mere

conventions of the mediævals, it was largely because they were (whatever

else they were) the very finest fraternity of free workmen the world is

ever likely to see.

The very things that were urged against Morris are in this sense part of

his ethical importance; part of the more promising and wholesome turn he

was half unconsciously giving to the movement of modern art. His hazier

fellow-Socialists blamed him because he made money; but this was at

least in some degree because he made other things to make money: it was

part of the real and refreshing fact that at last an æsthete had

appeared who could make something. If he was a capitalist, at least he

was what later capitalists cannot or will not be—something higher than

a capitalist, a tradesman. As compared with aristocrats like Swinburne

or aliens like Rossetti, he was vitally English and vitally Victorian.

He inherits some of that paradoxical glory which Napoleon gave

reluctantly to a nation of shopkeepers. He was the last of that nation;

he did not go out golfing: like that founder of the artistic shopman,

Samuel Richardson, “he kept his shop, and his shop kept him.” The

importance of his Socialism can easily be exaggerated. Among other

lesser points, he was not a Socialist; he was a sort of Dickensian

anarchist. His instinct for titles was always exquisite. It is part of

his instinct of decoration: for on a page the title always looks

important and the printed mass of matter a mere dado under it. And no

one had ever nobler titles than The Roots of the Mountains or _The

Wood at the End of the World_. The reader feels he hardly need read the

fairy-tale because the title is so suggestive. But, when all is said, he

never chose a better title than that of his social Utopia, _News from

Nowhere_. He wrote it while the last Victorians were already embarked on

their bold task of fixing the future—of narrating to-day what has

happened to-morrow. They named their books by cold titles suggesting

straight corridors of marble—titles like Looking Backward. But Morris

was an artist as well as an anarchist. News from Nowhere is an

irresponsible title; and it is an irresponsible book. It does not

describe the problem solved; it does not describe wealth either wielded

by the State or divided equally among the citizens. It simply describes

an undiscovered country where every one feels good-natured all day. That

he could even dream so is his true dignity as a poet. He was the first

of the Æsthetes to smell mediævalism as a smell of the morning; and not

as a mere scent of decay.

With him the poetry that had been peculiarly Victorian practically

ends; and, on the whole, it is a happy ending. There are many other

minor names of major importance; but for one reason or other they do not

derive from the schools that had dominated this epoch as such. Thus

Thompson, the author of The City of Dreadful Night, was a fine poet;

but his pessimism combined with a close pugnacity does not follow any of

the large but loose lines of the Swinburnian age. But he was a great

person—he knew how to be democratic in the dark. Thus Coventry Patmore

was a much greater person. He was bursting with ideas, like

Browning—and truer ideas as a rule. He was as eccentric and florid and

Elizabethan as Browning; and often in moods and metres that even

Browning was never wild enough to think of. No one will ever forget the

first time he read Patmore’s hint that the cosmos is a thing that God

made huge only “to make dirt cheap”; just as nobody will ever forget the

sudden shout he uttered when he first heard Mrs. Todgers asked for the

rough outline of a wooden leg. These things are not jokes, but

discoveries. But the very fact that Patmore was, as it were, the

Catholic Browning, keeps him out of the Victorian atmosphere as such.

The Victorian English simply thought him an indecent sentimentalist, as

they did all the hot and humble religious diarists of Italy or Spain.

Something of the same fate followed the most powerful of that last

Victorian group who were called “Minor Poets.” They numbered many other

fine artists: notably Mr. William Watson, who is truly Victorian in that

he made a manly attempt to tread down the decadents and return to the

right reason of Wordsworth—

    "I have not paid the world

The evil and the insolent courtesy

Of offering it my baseness as a gift."

But none of them were able even to understand Francis Thompson; his

sky-scraping humility, his mountains of mystical detail, his occasional

and unashamed weakness, his sudden and sacred blasphemies. Perhaps the

shortest definition of the Victorian Age is that he stood outside it.

CHAPTER IV

THE BREAK-UP OF THE COMPROMISE

If it be curiously and carefully considered it will, I think, appear

more and more true that the struggle between the old spiritual theory

and the new material theory in England ended simply in a deadlock; and a

deadlock that has endured. It is still impossible to say absolutely that

England is a Christian country or a heathen country; almost exactly as

it was impossible when Herbert Spencer began to write. Separate elements

of both sorts are alive, and even increasingly alive. But neither the

believer nor the unbeliever has the impudence to call himself the

Englishman. Certainly the great Victorian rationalism has succeeded in

doing a damage to religion. It has done what is perhaps the worst of all

damages to religion. It has driven it entirely into the power of the

religious people. Men like Newman, men like Coventry Patmore, men who

would have been mystics in any case, were driven back upon being much

more extravagantly religious than they would have been in a religious

country. Men like Huxley, men like Kingsley, men like most Victorian

men, were equally driven back on being irreligious; that is, on doubting

things which men’s normal imagination does not necessarily doubt. But

certainly the most final and forcible fact is that this war ended like

the battle of Sheriffmuir, as the poet says; they both did fight, and

both did beat, and both did run away. They have left to their

descendants a treaty that has become a dull torture. Men may believe in

immortality, and none of the men know why. Men may not believe in

miracles, and none of the men know why. The Christian Church had been

just strong enough to check the conquest of her chief citadels. The

rationalist movement had been just strong enough to conquer some of her

outposts, as it seemed, for ever. Neither was strong enough to expel the

other; and Victorian England was in a state which some call liberty and

some call lockjaw.

But the situation can be stated another way. There came a time, roughly

somewhere about 1880, when the two great positive enthusiasms of Western

Europe had for the time exhausted each other—Christianity and the

French Revolution. About that time there used to be a sad and not

unsympathetic jest going about to the effect that Queen Victoria might

very well live longer than the Prince of Wales. Somewhat in the same

way, though the republican impulse was hardly a hundred years old and

the religious impulse nearly two thousand, yet as far as England was

concerned, the old wave and the new seemed to be spent at the same time.

On the one hand Darwin, especially through the strong journalistic

genius of Huxley, had won a very wide spread though an exceedingly

vague victory. I do not mean that Darwin’s own doctrine was vague; his

was merely one particular hypothesis about how animal variety might have

arisen; and that particular hypothesis, though it will always be

interesting, is now very much the reverse of secure. But it is only in

the strictly scientific world and among strictly scientific men that

Darwin’s detailed suggestion has largely broken down. The general public

impression that he had entirely proved his case (whatever it was) was

early arrived at, and still remains. It was and is hazily associated

with the negation of religion. But (and this is the important point) it

was also associated with the negation of democracy. The same

Mid-Victorian muddle-headedness that made people think that “evolution”

meant that we need not admit the supremacy of God, also made them think

that “survival” meant that we must admit the supremacy of men. Huxley

had no hand in spreading these fallacies; he was a fair fighter; and he

told his own followers, who spoke thus, most emphatically not to play

the fool. He said most strongly that his or any theory of evolution left

the old philosophical arguments for a creator, right or wrong, exactly

where they were before. He also said most emphatically that any one who

used the argument of Nature against the ideal of justice or an equal

law, was as senseless as a gardener who should fight on the side of the

ill weeds merely because they grew apace. I wish, indeed, that in such a

rude summary as this, I had space to do justice to Huxley as a literary

man and a moralist. He had a live taste and talent for the English

tongue, which he devoted to the task of keeping Victorian rationalism

rational. He did not succeed. As so often happens when a rather

unhealthy doubt is in the atmosphere, the strongest words of their great

captain could not keep the growing crowds of agnostics back from the

most hopeless and inhuman extremes of destructive thought. Nonsense not

yet quite dead about the folly of allowing the unfit to survive began

to be more and more wildly whispered. Such helpless specimens of

“advanced thought” are, of course, quite as inconsistent with Darwinism

as they are with democracy or with any other intelligent proposition

ever offered. But these unintelligent propositions were offered; and the

ultimate result was this rather important one: that the harshness of

Utilitarianism began to turn into downright tyranny. That beautiful

faith in human nature and in freedom which had made delicate the dry air

of John Stuart Mill; that robust, romantic sense of justice which had

redeemed even the injustices of Macaulay—all that seemed slowly and

sadly to be drying up. Under the shock of Darwinism all that was good in

the Victorian rationalism shook and dissolved like dust. All that was

bad in it abode and clung like clay. The magnificent emancipation

evaporated; the mean calculation remained. One could still calculate in

clear statistical tables, how many men lived, how many men died. One

must not ask how they lived; for that is politics. One must not ask how

they died; for that is religion. And religion and politics were ruled

out of all the Later Victorian debating clubs; even including the

debating club at Westminster. What third thing they were discussing,

which was neither religion nor politics, I do not know. I have tried the

experiment of reading solidly through a vast number of their records and

reviews and discussions; and still I do not know. The only third thing I

can think of to balance religion and politics is art; and no one well

acquainted with the debates at St. Stephen’s will imagine that the art

of extreme eloquence was the cause of the confusion. None will maintain

that our political masters are removed from us by an infinite artistic

superiority in the choice of words. The politicians know nothing of

politics, which is their own affair: they know nothing of religion,

which is certainly not their affair: it may legitimately be said that

they have to do with nothing; they have reached that low and last level

where a man knows as little about his own claim, as he does about his

enemies’. In any case there can be no doubt about the effect of this

particular situation on the problem of ethics and science. The duty of

dragging truth out by the tail or the hind leg or any other corner one

can possibly get hold of, a perfectly sound duty in itself, had somehow

come into collision with the older and larger duty of knowing something

about the organism and ends of a creature; or, in the everyday phrase,

being able to make head or tail of it. This paradox pursued and

tormented the Victorians. They could not or would not see that humanity

repels or welcomes the railway-train, simply according to what people

come by it. They could not see that one welcomes or smashes the

telephone, according to what words one hears in it. They really seem to

have felt that the train could be a substitute for its own passengers;

or the telephone a substitute for its own voice.

In any case it is clear that a change had begun to pass over scientific

inquiry, of which we have seen the culmination in our own day. There had

begun that easy automatic habit, of science as an oiled and

smooth-running machine, that habit of treating things as obviously

unquestionable, when, indeed, they are obviously questionable. This

began with vaccination in the Early Victorian Age; it extended to the

early licence of vivisection in its later age; it has found a sort of

fitting foolscap, or crown of crime and folly, in the thing called

Eugenics. In all three cases the point was not so much that the pioneers

had not proved their case; it was rather that, by an unexpressed rule of

respectability, they were not required to prove it. This rather abrupt

twist of the rationalistic mind in the direction of arbitrary power,

certainly weakened the Liberal movement from within. And meanwhile it

was being weakened by heavy blows from without.

There is a week that is the turn of the year; there was a year that was

the turn of the century. About 1870 the force of the French Revolution

faltered and fell: the year that was everywhere the death of Liberal

ideas: the year when Paris fell: the year when Dickens died. While the

new foes of freedom, the sceptics and scientists, were damaging

democracy in ideas, the old foes of freedom, the emperors and the kings,

were damaging her more heavily in arms. For a moment it almost seemed

that the old Tory ring of iron, the Holy Alliance, had recombined

against France. But there was just this difference: that the Holy

Alliance was now not arguably, but almost avowedly, an Unholy Alliance.

It was an alliance between those who still thought they could deny the

dignity of man and those who had recently begun to have a bright hope of

denying even the dignity of God. Eighteenth-century Prussia was

Protestant and probably religious. Nineteenth-century Prussia was almost

utterly atheist. Thus the old spirit of liberty felt itself shut up at

both ends, that which was called progressive and that which was called

reactionary: barricaded by Bismarck with blood and iron and by Darwin by

blood and bones. The enormous depression which infects many excellent

people born about this time, probably has this cause.

It was a great calamity that the freedom of Wilkes and the faith of Dr.

Johnson fought each other. But it was an even worse calamity that they

practically killed each other. They killed each other almost

simultaneously, like Herminius and Mamilius. Liberalism (in Newman’s

sense) really did strike Christianity through headpiece and through

head; that is, it did daze and stun the ignorant and ill-prepared

intellect of the English Christian. And Christianity did smite

Liberalism through breastplate and through breast; that is, it did

succeed, through arms and all sorts of awful accidents, in piercing more

or less to the heart of the Utilitarian—and finding that he had none.

Victorian Protestantism had not head enough for the business; Victorian

Radicalism had not heart enough for the business. Down fell they dead

together, exactly as Macaulay’s Lay says, and still stood all who saw

them fall almost until the hour at which I write.

This coincident collapse of both religious and political idealism

produced a curious cold air of emptiness and real subconscious

agnosticism such as is extremely unusual in the history of mankind. It

is what Mr. Wells, with his usual verbal delicacy and accuracy, spoke of

as that ironical silence that follows a great controversy. It is what

people less intelligent than Mr. Wells meant by calling themselves _fin

de siècle_; though, of course, rationally speaking, there is no more

reason for being sad towards the end of a hundred years than towards the

end of five hundred fortnights. There was no arithmetical autumn, but

there was a spiritual one. And it came from the fact suggested in the

paragraphs above; the sense that man’s two great inspirations had

failed him together. The Christian religion was much more dead in the

eighteenth century than it was in the nineteenth century. But the

republican enthusiasm was also much more alive. If their scepticism was

cold, and their faith even colder, their practical politics were wildly

idealistic; and if they doubted the kingdom of heaven, they were

gloriously credulous about the chances of it coming on earth. In the

same way the old pagan republican feeling was much more dead in the

feudal darkness of the eleventh or twelfth centuries, than it was even a

century later; but if creative politics were at their lowest, creative

theology was almost at its highest point of energy.

The modern world, in fact, had fallen between two stools. It had fallen

between that austere old three-legged stool which was the tripod of the

cold priestess of Apollo; and that other mystical and mediæval stool

that may well be called the Stool of Repentance. It kept neither of the

two values as intensely valuable. It could not believe in the bonds that

bound men; but, then, neither could it believe in the men they bound. It

was always restrained in its hatred of slavery by a half remembrance of

its yet greater hatred of liberty. They were almost alone, I think, in

thus carrying to its extreme the negative attitude already noted in Miss

Arabella Allen. Anselm would have despised a civic crown, but he would

not have despised a relic. Voltaire would have despised a relic; but he

would not have despised a vote. We hardly find them both despised till

we come to the age of Oscar Wilde.

These years that followed on that double disillusionment were like one

long afternoon in a rich house on a rainy day. It was not merely that

everybody believed that nothing would happen; it was also that everybody

believed that anything happening was even duller than nothing happening.

It was in this stale atmosphere that a few flickers of the old

Swinburnian flame survived; and were called Art. The great men of the

older artistic movement did not live in this time; rather they lived

through it. But this time did produce an interregnum of art that had a

truth of its own; though that truth was near to being only a consistent

lie.

The movement of those called Æsthetes (as satirised in Patience) and

the movement of those afterwards called Decadents (satirised in Mr.

Street’s delightful Autobiography of a Boy) had the same captain; or

at any rate the same bandmaster. Oscar Wilde walked in front of the

first procession wearing a sunflower, and in front of the second

procession wearing a green carnation. With the æsthetic movement and its

more serious elements, I deal elsewhere; but the second appearance of

Wilde is also connected with real intellectual influences, largely

negative, indeed, but subtle and influential. The mark in most of the

arts of this time was a certain quality which those who like it would

call “uniqueness of aspect,” and those who do not like it “not quite

coming off.” I mean the thing meant something from one standpoint; but

its mark was that the smallest change of standpoint made it unmeaning

and unthinkable—a foolish joke. A beggar painted by Rembrandt is as

solid as a statue, however roughly he is sketched in; the soul can walk

all round him like a public monument. We see he would have other

aspects; and that they would all be the aspects of a beggar. Even if one

did not admit the extraordinary qualities in the painting, one would

have to admit the ordinary qualities in the sitter. If it is not a

masterpiece it is a man. But a nocturne by Whistler of mist on the

Thames is either a masterpiece or it is nothing; it is either a nocturne

or a nightmare of childish nonsense. Made in a certain mood, viewed

through a certain temperament, conceived under certain conventions, it

may be, it often is, an unreplaceable poem, a vision that may never be

seen again. But the moment it ceases to be a splendid picture it ceases

to be a picture at all. Or, again, if Hamlet is not a great tragedy it

is an uncommonly good tale. The people and the posture of affairs would

still be there even if one thought that Shakespeare’s moral attitude was

wrong. Just as one could imagine all the other sides of Rembrandt’s

beggar, so, with the mind’s eye (Horatio), one can see all four sides of

the castle of Elsinore. One might tell the tale from the point of view

of Laërtes or Claudius or Polonius or the gravedigger; and it would

still be a good tale and the same tale. But if we take a play like

Pelléas and Mélisande, we shall find that unless we grasp the

particular fairy thread of thought the poet rather hazily flings to us,

we cannot grasp anything whatever. Except from one extreme poetic point

of view, the thing is not a play; it is not a bad play, it is a mass of

clotted nonsense. One whole act describes the lovers going to look for a

ring in a distant cave when they both know they have dropped it down a

well. Seen from some secret window on some special side of the soul’s

turret, this might convey a sense of faerie futility in our human life.

But it is quite obvious that unless it called forth that one kind of

sympathy, it would call forth nothing but laughter and rotten eggs. In

the same play the husband chases his wife with a drawn sword, the wife

remarking at intervals “I am not gay.” Now there may really be an idea

in this; the idea of human misfortune coming most cruelly upon the

optimism of innocence; that the lonely human heart says, like a child at

a party, “I am not enjoying myself as I thought I should.” But it is

plain that unless one thinks of this idea (and of this idea only) the

expression is not in the least unsuccessful pathos; it is very broad and

highly successful farce. Maeterlinck and the decadents, in short, may

fairly boast of being subtle; but they must not mind if they are called

narrow.

This is the spirit of Wilde’s work and of most of the literary work done

in that time and fashion. It is, as Mr. Arthur Symons said, an attitude;

but it is an attitude in the flat, not in the round; not a statue, but

the cardboard king in a toy-theatre, which can only be looked at from

the front. In Wilde’s own poetry we have particularly a perpetually

toppling possibility of the absurd; a sense of just falling too short or

just going too far. “Plant lilies at my head” has something wrong about

it; something silly that is not there in—

"And put a grey stone at my head"

in the old ballad. But even where Wilde was right, he had a way of being

right with this excessive strain on the reader’s sympathy (and gravity)

which was the mark of all these men with a “point of view.” There is a

very sound sonnet of his in which he begins by lamenting mere anarchy,

as hostile to the art and civilisation that were his only gods; but ends

by saying—

                              "And yet

These Christs that die upon the barricades

God knows that I am with them--in some ways."

Now that is really very true; that is the way a man of wide reading and

worldly experience, but not ungenerous impulses, does feel about the

mere fanatic, who is at once a nuisance to humanity and an honour to

human nature. Yet who can read that last line without feeling that Wilde

is poised on the edge of a precipice of bathos; that the phrase comes

very near to being quite startlingly silly. It is as in the case of

Maeterlinck, let the reader move his standpoint one inch nearer the

popular standpoint, and there is nothing for the thing but harsh,

hostile, unconquerable mirth. Somehow the image of Wilde lolling like an

elegant leviathan on a sofa, and saying between the whiffs of a scented

cigarette that martyrdom is martyrdom in some respects, has seized on

and mastered all more delicate considerations in the mind. It is unwise

in a poet to goad the sleeping lion of laughter.

In less dexterous hands the decadent idea, what there was of it, went

entirely to pieces, which nobody has troubled to pick up. Oddly enough

(unless this be always the Nemesis of excess) it began to be

insupportable in the very ways in which it claimed specially to be

subtle and tactful; in the feeling for different art-forms, in the

welding of subject and style, in the appropriateness of the epithet and

the unity of the mood. Wilde himself wrote some things that were not

immorality, but merely bad taste; not the bad taste of the conservative

suburbs, which merely means anything violent or shocking, but real bad

taste; as in a stern subject treated in a florid style; an over-dressed

woman at a supper of old friends; or a bad joke that nobody had time to

laugh at. This mixture of sensibility and coarseness in the man was very

curious; and I for one cannot endure (for example) his sensual way of

speaking of dead substances, satin or marble or velvet, as if he were

stroking a lot of dogs and cats. But there was a sort of power—or at

least weight—in his coarseness. His lapses were those proper to the one

good thing he really was, an Irish swashbuckler—a fighter. Some of the

Roman Emperors might have had the same luxuriousness and yet the same

courage. But the later decadents were far worse, especially the decadent

critics, the decadent illustrators—there were even decadent publishers.

And they utterly lost the light and reason of their existence: they were

masters of the clumsy and the incongruous. I will take only one example.

Aubrey Beardsley may be admired as an artist or no; he does not enter

into the scope of this book. But it is true that there is a certain

brief mood, a certain narrow aspect of life, which he renders to the

imagination rightly. It is mostly felt under white, deathly lights in

Piccadilly, with the black hollow of heaven behind shiny hats or painted

faces: a horrible impression that all mankind are masks. This being the

thing Beardsley could express (and the only thing he could express), it

is the solemn and awful fact that he was set down to illustrate Malory’s

Morte d’Arthur. There is no need to say more; taste, in the artist’s

sense, must have been utterly dead. They might as well have employed

Burne-Jones to illustrate Martin Chuzzlewit. It would not have been

more ludicrous than putting this portrayer of evil puppets, with their

thin lines like wire and their small faces like perverted children’s, to

trace against the grand barbaric forests the sin and the sorrow of

Lancelot.

To return to the chief of the decadents, I will not speak of the end of

the individual story: there was horror and there was expiation. And, as

my conscience goes at least, no man should say one word that could

weaken the horror—or the pardon. But there is one literary consequence

of the thing which must be mentioned, because it bears us on to that

much breezier movement which first began to break in upon all this

ghastly idleness—I mean the Socialist Movement. I do not mean “_De

Profundis_”; I do not think he had got to the real depths when he wrote

that book. I mean the one real thing he ever wrote: _The Ballad of

Reading Gaol_; in which we hear a cry for common justice and brotherhood

very much deeper, more democratic and more true to the real trend of the

populace to-day, than anything the Socialists ever uttered even in the

boldest pages of Bernard Shaw.

Before we pass on to the two expansive movements in which the Victorian

Age really ended, the accident of a distinguished artist is available

for estimating this somewhat cool and sad afternoon of the epoch at its

purest; not in lounging pessimism or luxurious aberrations, but in

earnest skill and a high devotion to letters. This change that had come,

like the change from a golden sunset to a grey twilight, can be very

adequately measured if we compare the insight and intricacy of Meredith

with the insight and intricacy of Mr. Henry James. The characters of

both are delicate and indisputable; but we must all have had a feeling

that the characters in Meredith are gods, but that the characters in

Henry James are ghosts. I do not mean that they are unreal: I believe in

ghosts. So does Mr. Henry James; he has written some of his very finest

literature about the little habits of these creatures. He is in the deep

sense of a dishonoured word, a Spiritualist if ever there was one. But

Meredith was a materialist as well. The difference is that a ghost is a

disembodied spirit; while a god (to be worth worrying about) must be an

embodied spirit. The presence of soul and substance together involves

one of the two or three things which most of the Victorians did not

understand—the thing called a sacrament. It is because he had a natural

affinity for this mystical materialism that Meredith, in spite of his

affectations, is a poet: and, in spite of his Victorian Agnosticism (or

ignorance) is a pious Pagan and not a mere Pantheist. Mr. Henry James is

at the other extreme. His thrill is not so much in symbol or mysterious

emblem as in the absence of interventions and protections between mind

and mind. It is not mystery: it is rather a sort of terror at knowing

too much. He lives in glass houses; he is akin to Maeterlinck in a

feeling of the nakedness of souls. None of the Meredithian things, wind

or wine or sex or stark nonsense, ever gets between Mr. James and his

prey. But the thing is a deficiency as well as a talent: we cannot but

admire the figures that walk about in his afternoon drawing-rooms; but

we have a certain sense that they are figures that have no faces.

For the rest, he is most widely known, or perhaps only most widely

chaffed, because of a literary style that lends itself to parody and is

a glorious feast for Mr. Max Beerbohm. It may be called The Hampered, or

Obstacle Race Style, in which one continually trips over commas and

relative clauses; and where the sense has to be perpetually qualified

lest it should mean too much. But such satire, however friendly, is in

some sense unfair to him; because it leaves out his sense of general

artistic design, which is not only high, but bold. This appears, I

think, most strongly in his short stories; in his long novels the reader

(or at least one reader) does get rather tired of everybody treating

everybody else in a manner which in real life would be an impossible

intellectual strain. But in his short studies there is the unanswerable

thing called real originality; especially in the very shape and point of

the tale. It may sound odd to compare him to Mr. Rudyard Kipling: but he

is like Kipling and also like Wells in this practical sense: that no one

ever wrote a story at all like the Mark of the Beast; no one ever

wrote a story at all like A Kink in Space: and in the same sense no

one ever wrote a story like The Great Good Place. It is alone in order

and species; and it is masterly. He struck his deepest note in that

terrible story, The Turn of the Screw; and though there is in the

heart of that horror a truth of repentance and religion, it is again

notable of the Victorian writers that the only supernatural note they

can strike assuredly is the tragic and almost the diabolic. Only Mr. Max

Beerbohm has been able to imagine Mr. Henry James writing about

Christmas.

Now upon this interregnum, this cold and brilliant waiting-room which

was Henry James at its highest and Wilde at its worst, there broke in

two positive movements, largely honest though essentially unhistoric and

profane, which were destined to crack up the old Victorian solidity past

repair. The first was Bernard Shaw and the Socialists: the second was

Rudyard Kipling and the Imperialists. I take the Socialists first not

because they necessarily came so in order of time, but because they were

less the note upon which the epoch actually ended.

William Morris, of whom we have already spoken, may be said to

introduce the Socialists, but rather in a social sense than a

philosophical. He was their friend, and in a sort of political way,

their father; but he was not their founder, for he would not have

believed a word of what they ultimately came to say. Nor is this the

conventional notion of the old man not keeping pace with the audacity of

the young. Morris would have been disgusted not with the wildness, but

the tameness of our tidy Fabians. He was not a Socialist, but he was a

Revolutionist; he didn’t know much more about what he was; but he knew

that. In this way, being a full-blooded fellow, he rather repeats the

genial sulkiness of Dickens. And if we take this fact about him first,

we shall find it a key to the whole movement of this time. For the one

dominating truth which overshadows everything else at this point is a

political and economic one. The Industrial System, run by a small class

of Capitalists on a theory of competitive contract, had been quite

honestly established by the early Victorians and was one of the primary

beliefs of Victorianism. The Industrial System, so run, had become

another name for hell. By Morris’s time and ever since, England has been

divided into three classes: Knaves, Fools, and Revolutionists.

History is full of forgotten controversies; and those who speak of

Socialism now have nearly all forgotten that for some time it was an

almost equal fight between Socialism and Anarchism for the leadership of

the exodus from Capitalism. It is here that Herbert Spencer comes in

logically, though not chronologically; also that much more interesting

man, Auberon Herbert. Spencer has no special place as a man of letters;

and a vastly exaggerated place as a philosopher. His real importance was

that he was very nearly an Anarchist. The indefinable greatness there is

about him after all, in spite of the silliest and smuggest limitations,

is in a certain consistency and completeness from his own point of

view. There is something mediæval, and therefore manful, about writing a

book about everything in the world. Now this simplicity expressed itself

in politics in carrying the Victorian worship of liberty to the most

ridiculous lengths; almost to the length of voluntary taxes and

voluntary insurance against murder. He tried, in short, to solve the

problem of the State by eliminating the State from it. He was resisted

in this by the powerful good sense of Huxley; but his books became

sacred books for a rising generation of rather bewildered rebels, who

thought we might perhaps get out of the mess if everybody did as he

liked.

Thus the Anarchists and Socialists fought a battle over the death-bed of

Victorian Industrialism; in which the Socialists (that is, those who

stood for increasing instead of diminishing the power of Government) won

a complete victory and have almost exterminated their enemy. The

Anarchist one meets here and there nowadays is a sad sight; he is

disappointed with the future, as well as with the past.

This victory of the Socialists was largely a literary victory; because

it was effected and popularised not only by a wit, but by a sincere wit;

and one who had the same sort of militant lucidity that Huxley had shown

in the last generation and Voltaire in the last century. A young Irish

journalist, impatient of the impoverished Protestantism and Liberalism

to which he had been bred, came out as the champion of Socialism not as

a matter of sentiment, but as a matter of common sense. The primary

position of Bernard Shaw towards the Victorian Age may be roughly

summarised thus: the typical Victorian said coolly: “Our system may not

be a perfect system, but it works.” Bernard Shaw replied, even more

coolly: “It may be a perfect system, for all I know or care. But it does

not work.” He and a society called the Fabians, which once exercised

considerable influence, followed this shrewd and sound strategic hint

to avoid mere emotional attack on the cruelty of Capitalism; and to

concentrate on its clumsiness, its ludicrous incapacity to do its own

work. This campaign succeeded, in the sense that while (in the educated

world) it was the Socialist who looked the fool at the beginning of that

campaign, it is the Anti-Socialist who looks the fool at the end of it.

But while it won the educated classes it lost the populace for ever. It

dried up those springs of blood and tears out of which all revolt must

come if it is to be anything but bureaucratic readjustment. We began

this book with the fires of the French Revolution still burning, but

burning low. Bernard Shaw was honestly in revolt in his own way: but it

was Bernard Shaw who trod out the last ember of the Great Revolution.

Bernard Shaw proceeded to apply to many other things the same sort of

hilarious realism which he thus successfully applied to the industrial

problem. He also enjoyed giving people a piece of his mind; but a piece

of his mind was a more appetising and less raw-looking object than a

piece of Hardy’s. There were many modes of revolt growing all around

him; Shaw supported them—and supplanted them. Many were pitting the

realism of war against the romance of war: they succeeded in making the

fight dreary and repulsive, but the book dreary and repulsive too. Shaw,

in Arms and the Man, did manage to make war funny as well as

frightful. Many were questioning the right of revenge or punishment; but

they wrote their books in such a way that the reader was ready to

release all mankind if he might revenge himself on the author. Shaw, in

Captain Brassbound’s Conversion, really showed at its best the merry

mercy of the pagan; that beautiful human nature that can neither rise to

penance nor sink to revenge. Many had proved that even the most

independent incomes drank blood out of the veins of the oppressed: but

they wrote it in such a style that their readers knew more about

depression than oppression. In Widowers’ Houses Shaw very nearly (but

not quite) succeeded in making a farce out of statistics. And the

ultimate utility of his brilliant interruption can best be expressed in

the very title of that play. When ages of essential European ethics have

said “widows’ houses,” it suddenly occurs to him to say “but what about

widowers’ houses?” There is a sort of insane equity about it which was

what Bernard Shaw had the power to give, and gave.

Out of the same social ferment arose a man of equally unquestionable

genius, Mr. H. G. Wells. His first importance was that he wrote great

adventure stories in the new world the men of science had discovered. He

walked on a round slippery world as boldly as Ulysses or Tom Jones had

worked on a flat one. Cyrano de Bergerac or Baron Munchausen, or other

typical men of science, had treated the moon as a mere flat silver

mirror in which Man saw his own image—the Man in the Moon. Wells

treated the moon as a globe, like our own; bringing forth monsters as

moonish as we are earthy. The exquisitely penetrating political and

social satire he afterwards wrote belongs to an age later than the

Victorian. But because, even from the beginning, his whole trend was

Socialist, it is right to place him here.

While the old Victorian ideas were being disturbed by an increasing

torture at home, they were also intoxicated by a new romance from

abroad. It did not come from Italy with Rossetti and Browning, or from

Persia with Fitzgerald: but it came from countries as remote, countries

which were (as the simple phrase of that period ran) “painted red” on

the map. It was an attempt to reform England through the newer nations;

by the criticism of the forgotten colonies, rather than of the forgotten

classes. Both Socialism and Imperialism were utterly alien to the

Victorian idea. From the point of view of a Victorian aristocrat like

Palmerston, Socialism would be the cheek of gutter snipes; Imperialism

would be the intrusion of cads. But cads are not alone concerned.

Broadly, the phase in which the Victorian epoch closed was what can only

be called the Imperialist phase. Between that and us stands a very

individual artist who must nevertheless be connected with that phase. As

I said at the beginning, Macaulay (or, rather, the mind Macaulay shared

with most of his powerful middle class) remains as a sort of pavement or

flat foundation under all the Victorians. They discussed the dogmas

rather than denied them. Now one of the dogmas of Macaulay was the dogma

of progress. A fair statement of the truth in it is not really so hard.

Investigation of anything naturally takes some little time. It takes

some time to sort letters so as to find a letter: it takes some time to

test a gas-bracket so as to find the leak; it takes some time to sift

evidence so as to find the truth. Now the curse that fell on the later

Victorians was this: that they began to value the time more than the

truth. One felt so secretarial when sorting letters that one never found

the letter; one felt so scientific in explaining gas that one never

found the leak; and one felt so judicial, so impartial, in weighing

evidence that one had to be bribed to come to any conclusion at all.

This was the last note of the Victorians: procrastination was called

progress.

Now if we look for the worst fruits of this fallacy we shall find them

in historical criticism. There is a curious habit of treating any one

who comes before a strong movement as the “forerunner” of that movement.

That is, he is treated as a sort of slave running in advance of a great

army. Obviously, the analogy really arises from St. John the Baptist,

for whom the phrase “forerunner” was rather peculiarly invented. Equally

obviously, such a phrase only applies to an alleged or real divine

event: otherwise the forerunner would be a founder. Unless Jesus had

been the Baptist’s God, He would simply have been his disciple.

Nevertheless the fallacy of the “forerunner” has been largely used in

literature. Thus men will call a universal satirist like Langland a

“morning star of the Reformation,” or some such rubbish; whereas the

Reformation was not larger, but much smaller than Langland. It was

simply the victory of one class of his foes, the greedy merchants, over

another class of his foes, the lazy abbots. In real history this

constantly occurs; that some small movement happens to favour one of the

million things suggested by some great man; whereupon the great man is

turned into the running slave of the small movement. Thus certain

sectarian movements borrowed the sensationalism without the

sacramentalism of Wesley. Thus certain groups of decadents found it

easier to imitate De Quincey’s opium than his eloquence. Unless we grasp

this plain common sense (that you or I are not responsible for what some

ridiculous sect a hundred years hence may choose to do with what we say)

the peculiar position of Stevenson in later Victorian letters cannot

begin to be understood. For he was a very universal man; and talked some

sense not only on every subject, but, so far as it is logically

possible, in every sense. But the glaring deficiencies of the Victorian

compromise had by that time begun to gape so wide that he was forced, by

mere freedom of philosophy and fancy, to urge the neglected things. And

yet this very urgency certainly brought on an opposite fever, which he

would not have liked if he had lived to understand it. He liked Kipling,

though with many healthy hesitations; but he would not have liked the

triumph of Kipling: which was the success of the politician and the

failure of the poet. Yet when we look back up the false perspective of

time, Stevenson does seem in a sense to have prepared that imperial and

downward path.

I shall not talk here, any more than anywhere else in this book, about

the “sedulous ape” business. No man ever wrote as well as Stevenson who

cared only about writing. Yet there is a sense, though a misleading one,

in which his original inspirations were artistic rather than purely

philosophical. To put the point in that curt covenanting way which he

himself could sometimes command, he thought it immoral to neglect

romance. The whole of his real position was expressed in that phrase of

one of his letters “our civilisation is a dingy ungentlemanly business:

it drops so much out of a man.” On the whole he concluded that what had

been dropped out of the man was the boy. He pursued pirates as Defoe

would have fled from them; and summed up his simplest emotions in that

touching cri de coeur “shall we never shed blood?” He did for the

penny dreadful what Coleridge had done for the penny ballad. He proved

that, because it was really human, it could really rise as near to

heaven as human nature could take it. If Thackeray is our youth,

Stevenson is our boyhood: and though this is not the most artistic

thing in him, it is the most important thing in the history of Victorian

art. All the other fine things he did were, for curious reasons, remote

from the current of his age. For instance, he had the good as well as

the bad of coming from a Scotch Calvinist’s house. No man in that age

had so healthy an instinct for the actuality of positive evil. In _The

Master of Ballantrae_ he did prove with a pen of steel, that the Devil

is a gentleman—but is none the less the Devil. It is also

characteristic of him (and of the revolt from Victorian respectability

in general) that his most blood-and-thunder sensational tale is also

that which contains his most intimate and bitter truth. _Dr. Jekyll and

Mr. Hyde_ is a double triumph; it has the outside excitement that

belongs to Conan Doyle with the inside excitement that belongs to Henry

James. Alas, it is equally characteristic of the Victorian time that

while nearly every Englishman has enjoyed the anecdote, hardly one

Englishman has seen the joke—I mean the point. You will find twenty

allusions to Jekyll and Hyde in a day’s newspaper reading. You will also

find that all such allusions suppose the two personalities to be equal,

neither caring for the other. Or more roughly, they think the book means

that man can be cloven into two creatures, good and evil. The whole stab

of the story is that man can’t: because while evil does not care for

good, good must care for evil. Or, in other words, man cannot escape

from God, because good is the God in man; and insists on omniscience.

This point, which is good psychology and also good theology and also

good art, has missed its main intention merely because it was also good

story-telling.

If the rather vague Victorian public did not appreciate the deep and

even tragic ethics with which Stevenson was concerned, still less were

they of a sort to appreciate the French finish and fastidiousness of his

style; in which he seemed to pick the right word up on the point of his

pen, like a man playing spillikins. But that style also had a quality

that could be felt; it had a military edge to it, an acies; and there

was a kind of swordsmanship about it. Thus all the circumstances led,

not so much to the narrowing of Stevenson to the romance of the fighting

spirit; but the narrowing of his influence to that romance. He had a

great many other things to say; but this was what we were willing to

hear: a reaction against the gross contempt for soldiering which had

really given a certain Chinese deadness to the Victorians. Yet another

circumstance thrust him down the same path; and in a manner not wholly

fortunate. The fact that he was a sick man immeasurably increases the

credit to his manhood in preaching a sane levity and pugnacious

optimism. But it also forbade him full familiarity with the actualities

of sport, war, or comradeship: and here and there his note is false in

these matters, and reminds one (though very remotely) of the mere

provincial bully that Henley sometimes sank to be.

For Stevenson had at his elbow a friend, an invalid like himself, a man

of courage and stoicism like himself; but a man in whom everything that

Stevenson made delicate and rational became unbalanced and blind. The

difference is, moreover, that Stevenson was quite right in claiming that

he could treat his limitation as an accident; that his medicines “did

not colour his life.” His life was really coloured out of a shilling

paint-box, like his toy-theatre: such high spirits as he had are the key

to him: his sufferings are not the key to him. But Henley’s sufferings

are the key to Henley; much must be excused him, and there is much to be

excused. The result was that while there was always a certain dainty

equity about Stevenson’s judgments, even when he was wrong, Henley

seemed to think that on the right side the wronger you were the better.

There was much that was feminine in him; and he is most understandable

when surprised in those little solitary poems which speak of emotions

mellowed, of sunset and a quiet end. Henley hurled himself into the new

fashion of praising Colonial adventure at the expense both of the

Christian and the republican traditions; but the sentiment did not

spread widely until the note was struck outside England in one of the

conquered countries; and a writer of Anglo-Indian short stories showed

the stamp of the thing called genius; that indefinable, dangerous and

often temporary thing.

For it is really impossible to criticise Rudyard Kipling as part of

Victorian literature, because he is the end of such literature. He has

many other powerful elements; an Indian element, which makes him

exquisitely sympathetic with the Indian; a vague Jingo influence which

makes him sympathetic with the man that crushes the Indian; a vague

journalistic sympathy with the men that misrepresent everything that has

happened to the Indian; but of the Victorian virtues, nothing.

All that was right or wrong in Kipling was expressed in the final

convulsion that he almost in person managed to achieve. The nearest that

any honest man can come to the thing called “impartiality” is to confess

that he is partial. I therefore confess that I think this last turn of

the Victorian Age was an unfortunate turn; much on the other side can be

said, and I hope will be said. But about the facts there can be no

question. The Imperialism of Kipling was equally remote from the

Victorian caution and the Victorian idealism: and our subject does quite

seriously end here. The world was full of the trampling of totally new

forces, gold was sighted from far in a sort of cynical romanticism: the

guns opened across Africa; and the great queen died.

   *       *       *       *       *

Of what will now be the future of so separate and almost secretive an

adventure of the English, the present writer will not permit himself,

even for an instant, to prophesy. The Victorian Age made one or two

mistakes, but they were mistakes that were really useful; that is,

mistakes that were really mistaken. They thought that commerce outside a

country must extend peace: it has certainly often extended war. They

thought that commerce inside a country must certainly promote

prosperity; it has largely promoted poverty. But for them these were

experiments; for us they ought to be lessons. If we continue the

capitalist use of the populace—if we continue the capitalist use of

external arms, it will lie heavy on the living. The dishonour will not

be on the dead.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

After having surveyed the immense field presented in such a volume as

Mr. George Mair’s Modern English Literature in this series, or, more

fully, in the Cambridge History of Modern Literature, the later volume

of Chambers’ English Literature, Mr. Gosse’s _History of Modern

English Literature_, or Henry Morley’s _English Literature in the Reign

of Victoria_, the wise reader will choose some portion for closer study,

and will go straight to the originals before he has any further traffic

with critics or commentators, however able.

He will then need the aid of fuller biographies. Some Victorian Lives

are already classic, or nearly so, among them Sir G. Trevelyan’s

Macaulay, Forster’s Dickens, Mrs. Gaskell’s Charlotte Brontë,

Froude’s Carlyle, and Sir E. T. Cook’s Ruskin. With these may be

ranged the great Dictionary of National Biography. The “English Men of

Letters” Series includes H. D. Traill’s Coleridge, Ainger’s Lamb,

Trollope’s Thackeray, Leslie Stephen’s George Eliot, Herbert Paul’s

Matthew Arnold, Sir A. Lyall’s Tennyson, G. K. Chesterton’s _Robert

Browning_, and A. C. Benson’s Fitzgerald. At least two autobiographies

must be named, those of Herbert Spencer and John Stuart Mill, and, as

antidote to Newman’s Apologia, the gay self-revelations of Borrow, and

Jefferies’ Story of My Heart. Other considerable volumes are W. J.

Cross’s George Eliot, Lionel Johnson’s Art of Thomas Hardy, Mr. W. M.

Rossetti’s Dante G. Rossetti, Colvin’s R. L. Stevenson, J. W.

Mackail’s William Morris, Holman Hunt’s Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood,

Sir Leslie Stephen’s The Utilitarians, Buxton Forman’s _Our Living

Poets_, Edward Thomas’s Swinburne, Monypenny’s Disraeli, Dawson’s

Victorian Novelists, and Stedman’s Victorian Poets. The “Everyman”

Short Biographical Dictionary of English Literature is useful for

dates.

The latter half of the second volume of Mr. F. A. Mumby’s _Letters of

Literary Men_ is devoted to the Victorian Age. There are fuller

collections of the Letters of Leigh Hunt, Thackeray, Dickens, the

Brownings, Fitzgerald, Charles Kingsley, Matthew Arnold, and more

recently the Letters of George Meredith, edited by his son.

Among the important critical writers of the period, Matthew Arnold

(Essays in Criticism, Study of Celtic Literature, etc.) stands

easily first. Others are John, now Lord, Morley (_Studies in

Literature_, etc.), Augustine Birrell (Obiter Dicta, Essays), W. E.

Henley (Views and Reviews), J. Addington Symonds (Essays), J.

Churton Collins, Richard Garnett, Stopford A. Brooke, George E. B.

Saintsbury (History of Criticism), R. H. Hutton (_Contemporary

Thought_), J. M. Robertson (Modern Humanists, Buckle, etc.), Frederic

Harrison (The Choice of Books, etc.), Andrew Lang, Walter Bagehot,

Edmund Gosse, Prof. Dowden, Sir Walter Raleigh, and Sir A. T. Quiller

Couch.

INDEX

Æsthetes, the, and Decadents, 218-27

Arnold, Matthew, 73-79, 87

Austen, Jane, 92, 105, 109

Bentham, 36

Blake, 20

Borrow, 151

Brontë, Charlotte, 92, 105, 110-14

----, Emily, 113

Browning, Elizabeth B., 176-82

----, R., 40-41, 159, 162-63

Byron, 22

Carlyle, 40, 49-62, 158

Carroll, Lewis, 153

Cobbett, 16-17, 88, 151

Coleridge, 20

Collins, Wilkie, 130, 132

Darwin, 38, 206-7, 209

De Quincey, 23-25, 65

Dickens, 40, 79-89, 100, 106, 119-23, 129, 131

Disraeli, 42, 135

Eliot, George, 92, 103-9, 157

Faber, 46

Fitzgerald, 192-95

French Revolution, Influence of, 18-21

Froude, 60, 62

Gaskell, Mrs., 94

Gilbert, 154

Hardy, Thomas, 138-39, 143-45

Hazlitt, 23

Henley, W. E., 247-48

Hood, Thomas, 25-27

Hughes, Tom, 73

Humour, Victorian, 152-55

Hunt, Leigh, 23

Huxley, 39-40, 205

Imperialism, 60, 239

James, Henry, 228-31

Keats, 20

Keble, 45

Kingsley, 40, 59, 64, 72, 134-35

Kipling, R., 60, 249-50

Lamb, 23

Landor, 23

Lear, Edward, 153

Literary temperament, the English, 13-16

Lytton, Bulwer, 135-37

Macaulay, 28-36, 55

Macdonald, George, 152

Maurice, F. D., 40, 73

Melbourne, Lord, 42

Meredith, George, 138-49, 228

Mill, J. S., 36-37, 55

Morris, Wm., 196-200, 232

Newman, 38, 40, 45-48, 78, 159

Novel, The Modern, 90-99

Oliphant, Mrs., 116-17

“Ouida,” 117

Oxford Movement, 42-45

Pater, Walter, 69-71

Patmore, 48, 201-2

Pre-Raphaelite School, 68, 72

Reade, Charles, 134

Rossetti, D. G. and C., 71, 188-91

Ruskin, 40, 62-8, 70, 158

Science, Victorian, 208-12

Shaw, G. B., 60, 235-38

Shelley, 22-23

Shorthouse, 149-50

Socialism, 60, 67, 122, 198, 227, 231-39

Spencer, Herbert, 75, 233-34

Stevenson, R. L., 243-49

Swinburne, 69, 159, 181-88

Tennyson, 40, 64, 160-69

Thackeray, 100, 110, 123-30, 158

Thompson, Francis, 48, 201, 202

Trollope, Anthony, 130, 132-33

Watson, Wm., 202

Wells, H. G., 238-39

Wilde, Oscar, 218-23

Women, Victorian, 91, 99, 104, 115-16, 140

End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Victorian Age in Literature, by

G. K. Chesterton

*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE VICTORIAN AGE IN LITERATURE ***

***** This file should be named 18639-8.txt or 18639-8.zip *****

This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:

    http://www.gutenberg.org/1/8/6/3/18639/

Produced by Karina Aleksandrova, Juliet Sutherland and the

Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net

Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions

will be renamed.

Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no

one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation

(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without

permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules,

set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to

copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to

protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project

Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you

charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you

do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the

rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose

such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and

research. They may be modified and printed and given away—you may do

practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is

subject to the trademark license, especially commercial

redistribution.

*** START: FULL LICENSE ***

THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE

PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK

To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free

distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work

(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase “Project

Gutenberg”), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project

Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at

http://gutenberg.org/license).

Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm

electronic works

1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm

electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to

and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property

(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all

the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy

all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession.

If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project

Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the

terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or

entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.

1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only be

used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who

agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few

things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works

even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See

paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project

Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement

and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic

works. See paragraph 1.E below.

1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the Foundation”

or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project

Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the

collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an

individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are

located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from

copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative

works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg

are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project

Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by

freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of

this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with

the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by

keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project

Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others.

1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern

what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in

a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check

the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement

before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or

creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project

Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning

the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United

States.

1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:

1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate

access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently

whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the

phrase “Project Gutenberg” appears, or with which the phrase “Project

Gutenberg” is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed,

copied or distributed:

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with

almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or

re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included

with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org

1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived

from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is

posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied

and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees

or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work

with the phrase “Project Gutenberg” associated with or appearing on the

work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1

through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the

Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or

1.E.9.

1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted

with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution

must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional

terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked

to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the

permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work.

1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm

License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this

work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm.

1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this

electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without

prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with

active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project

Gutenberg-tm License.

1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,

compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any

word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or

distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than

“Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other format used in the official version

posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org),

you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a

copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon

request, of the work in its original “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other

form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm

License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.

1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,

performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works

unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.

1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing

access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided

that

  • You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from

    the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method

    you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is

    owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he

    has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the

    Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments

    must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you

    prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax

    returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and

    sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the

    address specified in Section 4, “Information about donations to

    the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation.”

  • You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies

    you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he

    does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm

    License. You must require such a user to return or

    destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium

    and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of

    Project Gutenberg-tm works.

  • You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any

    money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the

    electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days

    of receipt of the work.

  • You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free

    distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works.

1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm

electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set

forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from

both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael

Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the

Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below.

1.F.

1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable

effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread

public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm

collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic

works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain

“Defects,” such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or

corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual

property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a

computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by

your equipment.

1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the “Right

of Replacement or Refund” described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project

Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project

Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project

Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all

liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal

fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT

LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE

PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE

TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE

LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR

INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH

DAMAGE.

1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a

defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can

receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a

written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you

received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with

your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with

the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a

refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity

providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to

receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy

is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further

opportunities to fix the problem.

1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth

in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’ WITH NO OTHER

WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO

WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.

1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied

warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages.

If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the

law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be

interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by

the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any

provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.

1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the

trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone

providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance

with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production,

promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works,

harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees,

that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do

or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm

work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any

Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause.

Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm

Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of

electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers

including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists

because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from

people in all walks of life.

Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the

assistance they need, is critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm’s

goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will

remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project

Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure

and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations.

To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation

and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4

and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org.

Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive

Foundation

The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit

501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the

state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal

Revenue Service. The Foundation’s EIN or federal tax identification

number is 64-6221541. Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at

http://pglaf.org/fundraising. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg

Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent

permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state’s laws.

The Foundation’s principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S.

Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered

throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at

809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email

business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact

information can be found at the Foundation’s web site and official

page at http://pglaf.org

For additional contact information:

 Dr. Gregory B. Newby

 Chief Executive and Director

 gbnewby@pglaf.org

Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg

Literary Archive Foundation

Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide

spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of

increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be

freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest

array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations

(5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt

status with the IRS.

The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating

charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United

States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a

considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up

with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations

where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To

SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any

particular state visit http://pglaf.org

While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we

have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition

against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who

approach us with offers to donate.

International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make

any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from

outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.

Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation

methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other

ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations.

To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate

Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic

works.

Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm

concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared

with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project

Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support.

Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed

editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S.

unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily

keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition.

Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility:

 http://www.gutenberg.org

This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm,

including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary

Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to

subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.